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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, state legislatures have passed a record number of abortion restrictions, many of 
which regulate the dialogue between doctor and patient before a woman can access abortion. As 
increasingly aggressive doctor-patient regulations are challenged, the courts are struggling to 
determine what constraints, if any, Casey placed on the state’s ability to regulate abortion in the 
interest of protecting potential life, short of outright abortion bans. This Article revisits the 
compromise struck in Casey, tracing its attempt to accommodate two constitutional goals in 
tension—the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the woman’s liberty interest in 
autonomously determining her reproductive future—through the undue burden framework. The 
Article argues that the truthful and nonmisleading standard for informed consent regulations in 
Casey is pivotal to implementing the balance the Court sought to strike. It seeks to uncover the 
standard’s roots in prior informed consent case law in order to provide a context for lower courts 
implementing the standard. It demonstrates that the nonmisleading standard, at least in part, 
arises from the Court’s opinion in Akron.  
This analysis is particularly important given the trajectory of state regulation of the doctor-patient 
dialogue. In Akron, the Court struck down a regulation where the state required the doctor to 
impart a number of disclosures that raised an inference that the state was seeking to mislead a 
woman’s decision-making. In Thornburgh, the Court struck down an informed consent law that 
sought to persuade women to continue their pregnancy but through nonmisleading means. In 
Casey, the Court reversed course and approved of regulations similar to those in Thornburgh 
but imposed a nonmisleading constraint on such regulation. Twenty years later, doctor-patient 
regulation more closely resembles the disclosures challenged in Akron than Thornburgh and 
Casey.  Therefore, a close analysis of the nonmisleading standard from Akron to Casey can aid 
courts in implementing the standard to maintain the balance of constitutional interests that 
Casey sought to strike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, state legislatures have passed a record number of 
abortion restrictions.  Many of these restrictions focus on crafting and 
regulating the content of the dialogue between doctor and patient 
before a woman can access an abortion.  As increasingly aggressive 
doctor-patient regulations are challenged, the courts are struggling to 
determine what constraints, if any, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey1 placed on the 
states’ ability to regulate abortion in the interest of protecting poten-
tial life, short of outright abortion bans.  This Article contributes to 
the scholarly dialogue regarding where courts should draw the consti-
tutional line on abortion regulation under Casey by analyzing Casey’s 
“truthful and nonmisleading” standard for regulations concerning 
doctor-patient dialogue.2  It revisits the compromise struck in Casey, 
tracing its attempt to accommodate two constitutional goals in ten-
sion—the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the woman’s 
liberty interest in autonomously determining her reproductive fu-
ture—through the undue burden framework.  The Article argues that 
the truthful and nonmisleading standard for doctor-patient dialogue 
regulation in Casey, particularly the nonmisleading component, is 
pivotal to implementing the balance the Court sought to strike by 
protecting a woman’s ultimate autonomy in making the decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
Nonmisleading in this context must mean something beyond 
technical truthfulness.  This Article demonstrates that it does; it re-
 
 1 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 2 Id. at 882. 
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flects the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey.  The Article 
uncovers the nonmisleading standard’s roots in prior informed con-
sent case law in order to provide a context for lower courts imple-
menting the standard.  It demonstrates that the nonmisleading 
standard, at least in part, arises from the Court’s opinion in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc..3  This analysis is particu-
larly important given the trajectory of state regulation of the doctor-
patient dialogue.  In Akron, the Court struck down a regulation which 
required the doctor to recite disclosures that raised an inference that 
the state was seeking to mislead a woman’s decision-making.4  In 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,5 the 
Court struck down an informed consent law that sought to persuade 
a woman to continue her pregnancy, but through nonmisleading 
means.  In Casey, the Court reversed course and approved of regula-
tions similar to those in Thornburgh but at the same time imposed a 
nonmisleading constraint on such regulation.6 
Twenty years later, doctor-patient regulations more closely resem-
ble the disclosures challenged in Akron than in Thornburgh and Casey.  
The new generation of doctor-patient dialogue regulation departs 
too far from traditional informed consent principles to be properly 
so-termed.  Instead, this Article will refer to the new generation of 
these regulations as “dissuasion laws” because the laws seek to dis-
suade women from having abortions by means that do not align with 
the principle of autonomy inherent in the informed consent model.  
However, as of yet, lower courts—focusing on the state deference as-
pect of the Casey balance—have failed to give force to the nonmis-
leading component of the truthful and nonmisleading standard.  
These courts have problematically used optional doctor commentary 
to “assuage” constitutional concerns, required doctors to give convo-
luted explanations to cure facially false disclosures without considera-
tion of the misleading results, and reduced the truthful and nonmis-
leading requirement to technical truthfulness only.  Given that the 
new generation of dissuasion laws closely tracks the statute struck 
down as misleading in Akron, a close analysis of the nonmisleading 
standard from Akron to Casey can aid courts in implementing the 
standard to maintain the balance of constitutional interests that Casey 
sought to strike. 
 
 3 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 4 Id. at 451–52. 
 5 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 6 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
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This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the Casey deci-
sion, the compromise embedded in it, and the truthful and nonmis-
leading standard within this framework.  Part II discusses two main 
strategies of the antiabortion movement in the years after Casey:  in-
crementalism and the women-protective antiabortion argument.  It 
conducts an inventory of the new generation of compulsory dissua-
sion laws from ideological disclosures to ultrasound laws.  Part III re-
views the post-Casey federal law addressing doctor-patient dialogue 
regulation and implementing the nonmisleading standard.  Until re-
cently, courts have been deferential to states in recognition of Casey’s 
permissive stance towards abortion regulation, but inattentive to the 
constraints Casey placed on such regulation.  Therefore, the doctrine 
currently lacks a robust conception of what misleading means in the 
Casey context.       
 Part IV turns to the nonmisleading standard.  It draws on Akron 
and Thornburgh to trace a doctrinal and stare decisis argument for a 
more robust conception of the nonmisleading standard that can im-
plement the autonomy-protecting aspect of the Casey compromise.  It 
argues that the nonmisleading standard can serve important constitu-
tional goals—protecting autonomy, smoking out unconstitutional 
purposes, and striking down women-protective statutes that are based 
on gender stereotypes and violate equality norms—while still preserv-
ing significant space for state regulation.  Finally, it applies the non-
misleading standard to three pieces of compulsory dissuasion legisla-
tion, demonstrating the standard’s importance, but also its 
limitations as only part of the larger undue burden framework:  (1) 
the “whole, separate, unique, living human being” disclosure; (2) the 
2011 South Dakota law, requiring overwhelming disclosures and a vis-
it to a “crisis pregnancy center”; and (3) the mandatory ultrasound 
with mandatory description law.  Given the constitutional values it 
serves and its doctrinal support, I argue that the nonmisleading 
standard is a fruitful place for courts to start recalibrating the en-
forcement of Casey to more accurately preserve the balance Casey 
sought to strike.  In recent years, a number of scholars 
have commented on the various ways in which the lower courts have 
eroded the autonomy-protecting aspects of Casey.  Linda Wharton, 
Susan Frietsche, and Kathryn Kolbert have comprehensively docu-
mented the lower courts’ imposition of nearly impossible evidentiary 
requirements for proving an undue burden where regulations in-
crease the cost and accessibility of abortion services as well as their re-
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jection of nearly all claims based on improper purpose.7  Priscilla 
Smith has noted the lower courts’ failure to attend to the legitimacy 
of state interests in abortion regulation.8  Caitlin Borgmann has ar-
gued that the undue burden standard’s lax application has under-
mined key rights of privacy inherent in the right to choose.9 
Concerns about the underenforcement of Casey’s autonomy-
preserving principle have also generated significant scholarly work on 
how to revive the undue burden standard’s force.  Smith has argued 
that litigators should introduce traditional sex equality arguments in 
challenges to abortion regulation.10  Khiara Bridges has argued that 
the lower courts must “unburden” the undue burden standard of its 
acceptance of the moral significance of the fetus, which she argues 
overdetermines every undue burden evaluation, and apply a morally 
agnostic undue burden standard.11  Less optimistic scholars have pro-
posed a look to the state constitutions and courts for constitutional 
protections no longer enforced in federal courts.12 
This Article contributes to this literature by suggesting analytical 
tools for applying the nonmisleading standard to more faithfully en-
force the compromise struck in Casey.  This Article is the first to close-
ly analyze the truthful and nonmisleading principle within the over-
arching framework of the undue burden standard and its guiding 
purpose:  protecting women’s autonomy while respecting the state’s 
interest in regulating to promote childbirth over abortion.  It is also 
the first to systematically track how the lower courts have applied this 
standard as challenges to dissuasion laws mount.  Most importantly, 
this Article contributes to the dialogue around the constitutionality of 
dissuasion laws—a major component of contemporary abortion litiga-
tion—by focusing on the history of the nonmisleading standard.  It 
 
 7 Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe:  Reflections 
on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 353 (2006). 
 8 Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants:  Using Sex Equality Arguments to De-
mand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 377, 389 (2011). 
 9 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s 
Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291, 324 (2010). 
 10 Smith, supra note 8, at 378. 
 11 Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary:  Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 916 (2010). 
 12 See Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive Rights, 
88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 177 (2008) (noting that state constitutions may provide abortion 
right protections as the “federal right declines”); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and 
Beyond:  Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 469, 469–70 (2009) (concluding that “state constitutions are playing an im-
portant role in safeguarding abortion rights in individual states in an era of diminished 
federal constitutional protection . . . at the federal level”). 
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uncovers a history of the nonmisleading requirement from Akron to 
Thornburgh to Casey that gives content to its purpose and meaning by 
connecting it to the overarching purposes of the Casey compromise, 
confirms its centrality to the Casey balance, and enhances its legitima-
cy in constitutional jurisprudence. In fact, the importance of barring 
misleading regulation was supported by Justice Byron White, an orig-
inal Roe dissenter.  Scholars have previously discarded all of Akron and 
Thornburgh as relics of pre-Casey jurisprudence.  This Article challeng-
es that assumption; a close reading of these cases suggests that parts 
of Akron should still inform the courts’ thinking about what is mis-
leading after Casey.  In fact, Casey standardized the concerns about 
misleading regulation that were first articulated in Akron.  The truth-
ful and nonmisleading standard is only a component of the undue 
burden framework. However, it is a central one that is growing in im-
portance as dissuasion laws mount and become increasingly aggres-
sive.  This Article provides the first systematic account of its history, 
an analysis of its implementation, and a path forward. 
I.  DECIPHERING THE CONTOURS OF THE CASEY COMPROMISE 
A.  Tension in the Undue Burden Standard:  Respecting the State’s Interest in 
Potential Life and Preserving Women’s Autonomy 
Twenty years ago, Planned Parenthood v. Casey13 worked a radical 
change in the constitutional law of abortion.  This section traces the 
goals of Casey and the contours of the Casey doctrine in implementing 
those goals.  In doing so, it seeks to discover the tools that are availa-
ble in the doctrine for determining what types of state regulation of 
abortion the decision opened the door for and what limits it placed 
on that regulation. 
1.  A New Direction in Abortion Jurisprudence:  The Trimester Framework 
to the Undue Burden Standard 
In Roe v. Wade,14 about twenty years prior to Casey, the Court rec-
ognized a constitutional right to privacy that encompassed the abor-
tion decision.15  To effectuate the right, the Court constructed the 
 
 13 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 14 410 U.S. 113, (1973). 
 15  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  The Roe decision built on the prior right to privacy cases protecting 
the use of contraception, first for married couples, then for all individuals.  Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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well-known trimester framework.16  During the first trimester, the 
state could not regulate access to abortion because it lacked a com-
pelling interest in either the health of the mother or the potential life 
of the fetus.17  During the second trimester, the state could regulate 
the abortion procedure in the interest of the health of the mother.18  
Only after viability (roughly coinciding with the third trimester of 
pregnancy) did the state have a compelling interest in the potential 
life of the fetus, thus allowing it to regulate and/or proscribe abor-
tion, “except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life 
or health of the mother.”19  From 1973 to 1992, the constitutional law 
on state regulation of abortion remained relatively stable.20  Over 
those years, the Court struck down numerous abortion regulations, 
including bans on particular procedures,21 hospitalization require-
ments,22 and informed consent laws designed to influence a woman’s 
decision.23  In 1989, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court 
indicated that it might reconsider its position on the abortion right 
and showed willingness to apply a significantly lower standard in 
 
 16 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
 17 Id. at 164. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 164–65. 
 20 This is not to say that there was no significant development in this area of the law or with 
regard to limitations placed upon the principles of Roe, only that the basic Roe framework 
remained intact.  See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (upholding the 
ban on the use of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622, 643–44 (1979) (holding that states can impose parental consent provisions for mi-
nors as long as those states provide adequate judicial bypass mechanisms). 
 21 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–71 (1976) (con-
cluding that a state law requiring spousal consent for an abortion is unconstitutional). 
 22 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (striking 
down “Akron’s requirement that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospi-
tal”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 478, 482 (1983) 
(holding that the Missouri statute “requir[ing] that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy 
be performed in a hospital” is unconstitutional). 
 23 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986) 
(holding that a state statute mandating that a doctor provide specific disclosures to a 
pregnant woman is unconstitutional); Akron, 462 U.S. at 442–49 (holding the same in an 
earlier case).  However, as this Article discusses in length, the required disclosures in Ak-
ron and Thornburgh were different in both kind and scope. 
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evaluating abortion regulations.24  Nonetheless, it refrained from ad-
dressing the core holdings of Roe or its implementation framework.25 
Casey was a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act.  In 
1988 and 1989, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the law to in-
clude new informed consent disclosures, a twenty-four-hour waiting 
period, a parental consent provision, a spousal notification require-
ment, and various other reporting requirements for clinics.26  The law 
included numerous provisions similar to those struck down by recent 
prior Supreme Court cases such as Akron27 and Thornburgh28—
including provisions drawn directly from its predecessor law, invali-
dated in Thornburgh in 198629—and thus presented a straightforward 
vehicle to challenge Roe. 
The Casey Court did not entirely overturn Roe, as many expected.  
However, the Casey plurality—composed of Justices Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter—did upend Roe’s 
clean rules on abortion regulation and reflected the tensions within 
the national debate.  It eliminated the trimester framework, upheld 
the state’s right to significantly regulate abortion throughout preg-
nancy, and reworked the constitutional underpinnings of a woman’s 
ultimate right to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy.  The 
Court introduced the undue burden framework, opening the door to 
 
 24 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (“Stare decisis . . . has less power in constitutional cases, where, 
save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed 
changes. . . . We have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of the 
Constitution that has proved ‘unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.’ . . . We 
think the Roe trimester framework falls into that category.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 25 Id. at 521.  (“This case . . . affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe . . . .”).  Even 
though this case elided the Roe question, the possibility of Roe’s demise was widely specu-
lated.  Due to recent changes in the composition of the Court, only two known support-
ers of the Roe decision remained on the bench:  Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice John 
Paul Stevens. The other Justices were either known opponents or recent Republican 
nominees presumed to oppose Roe.  Linda Greenhouse, Both Sides in Abortion Argument 
Look Past Court to Political Battle, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at A1.  Even pro-choice groups 
seemed resigned to the belief that the Court was poised to overturn Roe.  Nonetheless, 
pro-choice advocates chose to challenge a Pennsylvania abortion regulation, seeking a re-
affirmation of Roe in the Supreme Court against the odds:  “The litigation strategy is,” ex-
plained the president of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, “[i]f indeed we don’t have 
Roe, American women ought to know about it and the Court shouldn’t be duplicitous.”  
Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Rights Groups Expect to Lose, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at A1.  She 
continued, “I don’t think we have anything to lose.”  Id.  It was in this setting that the Ca-
sey challenge arrived in the Court in 1992. 
 26 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3205–06, 3209, 3214 (1990). 
 27 462 U.S. 416, 422–24, 448 (1983). 
 28 476 U.S. 747, 750, 764 (1986). 
 29 Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759–71 (describing the provisions challenged in Thorn-
bugh) with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879–
901 (1992) (analyzing the various provisions challenged in Casey). 
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significant state regulation of abortion, but placing constitutional lim-
its on the state to respect women’s autonomy in the ultimate decision-
making. 
The Court found that Roe’s “rigid prohibition” on nearly all regu-
lation in the first trimester of pregnancy “undervalue[d] the State’s 
interest in potential life.”30  Thus, recognition and respect for the 
state’s interest in legislating to protect potential life was central to the 
Casey decision and its holdings.  But at the same time, the Court up-
held the “essential holding” of Roe:  the right of a woman, before via-
bility, to choose to have an abortion and obtain it “without undue in-
terference from the State.”31  It reaffirmed the root principle that a 
woman should have the autonomy to decide whether or not to con-
tinue her pregnancy and that state action must be limited to ensure 
that the right exists not only in theory, but also in fact.32  Nonetheless, 
in recognition of countervailing state interests, how and to what ex-
tent state action must be limited changed.  Under Casey, the state on-
ly violates the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause when it 
unduly burdens a woman’s ability to decide to terminate her preg-
nancy, irrespective of when during pregnancy the regulation oper-
ates.33  The Court defined an undue burden as any regulation that 
has the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”34 
The breadth of the change in the standard is demonstrated by the 
Court’s holdings.  Whereas only six years earlier, the Court had 
struck down nearly all of the provisions of a practically identical stat-
ute, the Court now upheld all the regulations except one.  The in-
formed consent provisions, including disclosures about gestational 
age and development, the waiting period, and the reporting re-
quirements all passed constitutional muster under the new standard.35  
However, the Court held that the spousal notification requirement, 
which required all married women to inform their spouses of their 
intents before they could access abortion services, presented an un-
due burden and therefore failed even under the lower bar of Casey.36  
Sensitive to the realities of spousal abuse in some marriages, the 
Court concluded that the notification requirements would represent 
 
 30 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992). 
 31 Id. at 846. 
 32 Id. at 872. 
 33 Id. at 876. 
 34 Id. at 877. 
 35 Id. at 884. 
 36 Id. at 898. 
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a “substantial obstacle” for women in these relationships.37  In cases of 
domestic abuse, the law would essentially result in the state granting a 
husband an “effective veto over his wife’s decision” in violation of the 
core liberty that both Roe and Casey aimed to protect.38  In the wake of 
Casey, it was clear that there had been a sea change in the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of abortion.  However, the contours of the 
change were less clear.  The Court replaced a bright line rule barring 
state interference with a fundamental right with a standard meant to 
vindicate conflicting constitutional interests and principles.  Outside 
of the particular provisions upheld or struck down in Casey, the con-
stitutionality of various possible abortion regulations became an open 
question. 
2.  Goals in Tension:  Respecting the State Interest in Potential Life and 
Women’s Autonomy 
The Casey decision has been widely described, both positively and 
negatively, as the Court’s attempt at a compromise in the abortion 
debate.  Professor Neal Devins describes the Casey decision as a “split-
the-difference” approach, which, he argues, largely “settled the abor-
tion wars.”39  However, the description of Casey as nothing more than 
a political choice to “split-the-difference” and broker a compromise 
on abortion, while convincing, does not sufficiently engage with the 
internal dialogue of Casey.  The puzzle of Casey is that it attempted to 
vindicate both the state’s interest in protecting potential life and the 
woman’s liberty interest in autonomous control over her reproduc-
tive life.  This Subpart analyzes how the Court’s opinion demonstrates 
deep engagement with this set of conflicting constitutional values and 
how the Court sought to use the undue burden standard to set the 
constitutional balance.  The Court’s opinion reflected an understand-
ing of the rights in conflict at issue in the case before them, unlike 
the Roe decision, which no longer reflected the values embedded in 
the debate over a woman’s right to choose.  As scholars Reva Siegel 
and Robert Post argue, the Court in Casey seriously engaged with “the 
ideals of both proponents and opponents of abortion” and thus “ac-
cord[ed] great respect to both sides of the abortion controversy.”40  
 
 37 Id. at 893–94. 
 38 Id. at 897. 
 39 Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 
YALE L.J. 1318, 1322 (2009). 
 40 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 428–29 (2007). 
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The Court’s reflection of the ongoing constitutional clash in our so-
ciety over abortion, they argue, epitomizes their theory of “democrat-
ic constitutionalism,” wherein constitutional law repeatedly interacts 
with the polity in shaping rights and constitutional structure.41 
The Casey Court gave far greater weight than Roe to the views ex-
pressed by abortion opponents and the states that seek to regulate 
(or eliminate) abortion to vindicate the rights of the unborn.  In Roe, 
the Court simply concluded that Texas, “by adopting one theory of 
life,” could not override the rights of pregnant women (an opinion 
shared by the Casey Court) without seriously appraising the state’s 
concerns.42  While the Court cursorily recognized the state’s interest 
in “protecting the potentiality of human life,”43 it did not consider it a 
valid purpose for any regulation whatsoever until viability.44 
Thus, the sea change in Casey primarily came from the Court’s re-
versal on how much weight the state is allowed to assign to the fetus 
in the regulation of abortion.  In Roe, the Court focused on the im-
pact of the abortion right on medical providers and their patients.45  
But Casey recognized the broader ramifications of the abortion right 
in a society torn about its moral implications: 
It is an act fraught with consequences for others:  for the woman who 
must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who per-
form and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society 
which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, proce-
dures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent 
human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life 
that is aborted.46 
The Court recognized the “substantial” and “profound” state interest 
in protecting potential life.47  Indeed, the plurality opinion stressed 
the weightiness of this interest even as measured against the woman’s 
liberty and equality rights, deferring the question of how the Justices 
would have resolved the question of these conflicting interests in the 
first instance: 
 
 41 Id. at 376. 
 42 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 163; see also Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise—Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 921, 929 (1992) (characterizing the Roe Court’s treatment of the state interest in 
potential life as “lip service”). 
 45  See, e.g., Betty Friedan, Abortion:  A Woman’s Civil Right, in LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. 
SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S RULING 255 (2010) (“[T]he Court figured the doctor as the agent re-
sponsible for abortion decisions and the criteria guiding those decisions as medical.”). 
 46 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
 47  Id. at 878. 
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The weight to be given this state interest . . . was the difficult question 
faced in Roe.  We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been 
Members of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came be-
fore it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court 
did . . . .48 
Eschewing the original question, the Court held that it would be in-
appropriate twenty years later to overturn Roe in its entirety.  Howev-
er, it also determined that the Roe trimester framework failed to 
properly value the state’s interest and held that regulations that “ex-
press profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted” 
throughout pregnancy, as long as they do not impose an undue bur-
den on the woman’s ultimate decision.49 
Even as it cut back significantly on the absolute protections of a 
woman’s right to abortion, the Casey Court also engaged more direct-
ly with the woman’s position in the abortion decision than the Roe 
Court.  The Roe decision paid little heed to the women’s rights argu-
ments articulated before it50 and that, at that time, were just begin-
ning to animate the public debate.51  Instead, the Court focused pri-
marily on doctors and the patient-doctor relationship:52 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical 
treatment according to his professional judgment . . . . [T]he abortion 
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, 
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.53 
Roe’s lack of attention to women and the equality arguments at the 
heart of the abortion issue is a main source of liberal critiques of the 
decision.  Perhaps most famously, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (then 
a judge on the D.C. Circuit) wrote: 
[I]n the balance is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s 
course—as Professor Karst put it, her ability to stand in relation to man, 
society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citi-
zen. . . . Overall, the Court’s Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the 
 
 48 Id. at 871. 
 49 Id. at 875–78. 
 50 See Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women 
Lawyers, et al. at 6–7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 
134283, at *6–7 (summarizing several reasons why the Georgia and Texas statutes at issue 
violated various women’s rights). 
 51 See, e.g., Friedan, supra note 45, at 8; see also id. at 256 (noting that while Roe’s holding 
“decriminalized abortion along the lines that the feminists and others advocated,” its rea-
soning “gave only blurry and indistinct expression to the values feminists argued were at 
stake in protecting women’s choices”). 
 52 Id. at 255 (“[T]he Court figured the doctor as the agent responsible for abortion deci-
sions and the criteria guiding those decisions as medical.”). 
 53 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165–66. 
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opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the 
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.54 
Casey’s discussion of the abortion right recognized in Roe focused 
more specifically on the woman in the decision, recognizing the vari-
ous intertwined liberty and equality rights at stake for her in the right 
to her reproductive freedom.  In explaining why the state cannot 
mandate that a woman continue her pregnancy against her wishes, 
the Court explained:  “[A woman’s] suffering is too intimate and per-
sonal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the 
woman’s role . . . .”55 The Court’s analysis of the spousal notification 
provision further recognized the intersection between a woman’s lib-
erty interest in the decision and her right to equal respect.  The 
Court held that the spousal notification law reflected antiquated 
views of the family and women’s role in marriage that the state is no 
longer constitutionally permitted to enforce: 
[The spousal notification requirement] embodies a view of marriage 
consonant with the common-law status of married women but repugnant 
to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights 
secured by the Constitution.  Women do not lose their constitutionally 
protected liberty when they marry.56 
These passages not only recognize the important liberty interest in 
the abortion decision—a woman’s “destiny . . . must be shaped to a 
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives”57—
but also tie the right to the sex equality argument that reproductive 
rights accord women equal respect and dignity by not allowing the 
state to enforce “its own vision of the woman’s role,” motherhood, 
upon her.58 
Casey also acknowledged the practical intersection between wom-
en’s liberty to control whether and when to have children and wom-
en’s ability to achieve equality in society more generally.  The Court 
 
 54 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383, 386 (1985); see also WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (J.M. 
Balkin ed., 2005)(compiling liberal critiques of Roe from prominent constitutional schol-
ars). 
 55 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
 56 Id. at 898. 
 57 Id. at 852. 
 58 Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights:  Their Critical Basis and Evolv-
ing Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007); see, e.g., id. at 819 (“Control 
over whether and when to give birth is also of crucial dignitary importance to women.  
Vesting women with control over whether and when to give birth breaks with the custom-
ary assumption that women exist to care for others.  It recognizes women as self-
governing agents who are competent to make decisions for themselves . . . . In a symbolic 
as well as a practical sense, then, reproductive rights repudiate customary assumptions 
about women’s agency and women’s roles.”). 
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considered how women’s equality gains in the past twenty years built 
upon the Court’s recognition of the abortion right:  “The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproduc-
tive lives.”59  This recognition from the Court reflects the argument, 
developed by women’s rights advocates and scholars, that without 
control over their reproductive lives, women cannot reach any level 
of practical equality in our society.  This view recognizes the immense 
effects of pregnancy on a woman’s life, from her health to her earn-
ing potential and economic security60 to her control over her intimate 
relationships.  As a member of the Society for Human Abortions, an 
early feminist abortion rights organization, put it, 
[W]e can get all the rights in the world . . . and none of them means a 
doggone thing if we . . . can’t control what happens to us, if the whole 
course of our lives can be changed by somebody else that can get us 
pregnant by accident, or by deceit, or by force.61 
This is particularly true in a world where institutions are still “orga-
nized on the basis of traditional sex-role assumptions that this society 
no longer believes fair to enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to 
redress.”62 
In sum, the Court’s analysis recognized the intersection of wom-
en’s equality and liberty rights imbedded in the right to abortion in a 
manner that prior constitutional jurisprudence had not.  It is perhaps 
unsurprising that Casey spoke in a constitutional register more fo-
cused on women’s rights than Roe.  Indeed, it would have been near 
impossible for the Court at the time of Roe to speak such strong sex 
equality talk; the very first sex equality case was decided only the year 
before.63  Even if the right was diluted after Casey, the stated constitu-
tional underpinnings of the abortion right now more closely align 
with the societal significance of the abortion right for women. 
 
 59 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. 
 60 See, e.g., Deborah J. Anderson, Melissa Binder & Kate Krause, The Motherhood Wage Penalty 
Revisited:  Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 273, 273 (2003) (“It is well documented that mothers earn less than women 
without children.”); Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 
66 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 205, 219 (2001) (reviewing numerous studies finding a wage penal-
ty for motherhood and finding a seven percent wage penalty for motherhood per child 
among young American women). 
 61 KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 97 (1984); see also FLORA 
DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN:  THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960, at 166 
(1991) (referencing Kristin Luker’s statement). 
 62 Siegel, supra note 58, at 819. 
 63 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
1368 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
B.  The Compromise Illustrated:  The Undue Burden Standard and the 
Truthful and Not Misleading Standard 
1.  The Content of the Undue Burden Standard 
Having established that the Casey court sought to respect both the 
state’s interest in protecting potential life and a woman’s liberty right 
in controlling her reproductive life, the remaining question is where 
the Court drew the line in effectuating the compromise between the-
se two seemingly irreconcilable values.  The undue burden standard 
has an inherent tension built within it.  What tools did it provide 
courts for negotiating this tension in evaluating abortion regulations? 
Professor Neal Devins suggests that the undue burden standard is 
essentially lacking in any substantive content to guide courts in nego-
tiating the interests in conflict in abortion cases:  “Casey is a sufficient-
ly malleable standard that it can be applied to either uphold or inval-
idate nearly any law that a state is likely to pass.”64  He labels it a 
“[s]uper-[p]recedent,”65 but its stable status, according to Devins, re-
lies upon its hollowness:  If Justices disagree with Casey, rather than 
overruling it, they will “manipulate the Casey precedent to support fa-
vored policy positions.”66  If Devins’ description is correct, then Casey 
effaces any prior content of the constitutional law on abortion, leav-
ing nothing but opaque space where states can legislate on abortion 
aggressively, but at the risk of the preferences of the judges that will 
adjudicate challenges. 
Meanwhile, numerous scholars and women’s rights advocates have 
argued that the undue burden standard does not, in reality, protect 
both sets of constitutional values, but rather sacrifices the ultimate 
decision-making autonomy of the woman to the state’s interest in 
regulation to protect the unborn.  National Abortion and Reproduc-
tive Rights Action League (NARAL) President Kate Michaelman 
called it a “smoke screen . . . devastating for women.”67  Professor 
Caitlin Borgmann called the Casey compromise “untenable,” arguing 
that, “[i]n trying to strike an impossible compromise on abortion, the 
Court in Casey opened the door to physical, familial, and spiritual in-
vasions of women’s privacy that serve little purpose but public sham-
ing and humiliation.”68  And Professor Maya Manian argued that Ca-
 
 64 Devins, supra note 39, at 1322. 
 65 Id. at 1330. 
 66 Id. at 1333–34. 
 67 Id. at 1329 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68 Borgmann, supra note 9, at 291–92. 
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sey’s own holdings “failed to deliver on the promise of its rhetoric and 
to apply the law consistently.”69 
As a descriptive matter of how Casey has sometimes been applied 
in the lower courts, either of these accounts might be true.70  Howev-
er, this Article seeks to take Casey seriously on its own terms.  A close 
account of Casey illustrates that the Court’s description and applica-
tion of the undue burden standard does provide guidance to states as 
to how they can regulate abortion, and how they cannot, in order to 
safeguard a woman’s ultimate choice.  Siegel describes Casey’s limits 
on state regulation as “dignity constraints” on the state’s ability to 
regulate abortion; the state can regulate abortion expressively but the 
dignity constraints ensure that the state cannot do so in ways that vio-
late a woman’s dignity by “restrict[ing] the autonomy of the pregnant 
woman or treat[ing] her instrumentally, as a means to an end.”71  In 
negotiating the tension in these two sets of constitutional claims, the 
Court chose not to adopt a pure balancing test where courts balance 
the state’s interest in protecting potential life against a women’s liber-
ty interest in each case.  Previous iterations of the undue burden 
standard did create such a balancing test.  In prior dissents, Justice 
O’Connor argued that the undue burden standard should be a 
“threshold inquiry,” after which the state would have to justify the 
regulation with a compelling state interest.72  The Court rejected this 
approach.73  Instead, it erected an autonomy-protecting limit on oth-
erwise permissible state regulation.  The state can regulate in the in-
terest of unborn life in many ways—the woman has no right to be “in-
sulated from all others”74 when making her decision—but regulations 
that pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ultimate decision are 
always unconstitutional under Casey, regardless of the strength of the state’s 
countervailing interest.  The Court articulated both a purpose and ef-
 
 69 Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman:  Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 250 (2009). 
 70 See, e.g., Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 353 (“With several significant ex-
ceptions that reflect the potential vigor and strength of the Casey standard, many lower 
federal courts have not been faithful to Casey’s promise.”). 
 71 Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion Restrictions Under Ca-
sey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1752 (2008). 
 72 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. (“The ‘undue burden’ required in the abortion 
cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court 
can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting ‘compelling state in-
terest’ standard.”). 
 73  See Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that this approach was “ex-
plicitly reject[ed]” in Casey). 
 74 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
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fect test for determining the validity of state abortion regulation:  
state laws can have neither the purpose nor the effect of hindering a 
woman’s ability to make this choice freely.75  The space for state ex-
pression of its profound respect for potential life is limited to forms 
of expression that are respectful of a woman’s decision-making capac-
ity:  “A statute with this purpose [of creating a substantial obstacle] is 
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest 
in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it.”76 
After Casey, there is no doubt that states can regulate to express 
their interest in unborn life in a manner that Roe never previously al-
lowed, creating space for political contestation and democratic 
churn.  But Casey did not also give carte blanche to states for any reg-
ulation of abortion whatsoever.  To the contrary, the space for state 
action is policed by the boundaries of the undue burden standard, 
which is why locating its contours is key to implementing the Casey 
compromise.  The undue burden standard was designed to “replace 
the Roe framework with a rigorous standard that carefully examines 
both the actual impact of restrictions on the women they affect and 
the governmental purpose underlying them.”77  The Court’s analysis 
of the spousal notification requirement reflects this approach.  It was 
“sensitive to the specific social context in which forced husband-
notification would operate,” and given the findings of fact regarding 
the intersection of domestic violence and reproductive freedom, in-
validated the law.78  Both Casey’s description and application of the 
undue burden standard indicate that states have wide discretion to 
regulate abortion, but that autonomy-protecting restraints limit that 
power when it invades the woman’s ultimate right to autonomous de-
cision-making.79 
2.  The Compromise in Informed Consent:  Truthful and Not Misleading 
The Court’s doctrinal shift on the acceptability of various in-
formed consent regulations also elucidates the compromise struck in 
Casey.  In 1976, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 
the Court upheld a written informed consent requirement, which re-
 
 75  Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 331. 
 78 Id. at 334. 
 79 See Siegel, supra note 71, at 1752 (“Women’s decisional autonomy is a core value the un-
due burden framework vindicates.”). 
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quired a woman to certify “that her consent is informed and freely 
given and is not the result of coercion.”80  However, in 1983 and 1986, 
in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. and Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, the Court 
struck down all state-scripted informed consent disclosures and re-
jected the state’s interest in regulating through informed consent ex-
cept to vindicate traditional medical informed consent principles of 
patient autonomy.  The Court’s decisions in Akron and Thornburgh 
developed three different rationales for invalidating an abortion in-
formed consent regulation.  First, in Akron and Thornburgh, the Court 
held that the state was not permitted to place a doctor in an “unde-
sired and uncomfortable straitjacket.”81  This holding closely aligns 
with Roe’s doctor-centered view of the abortion right.  Second, in 
both cases, the Court held unequivocally that the state could not use 
informed consent laws, regardless of their content, in order to “influ-
ence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.”82 
Third, in Akron (but not Thornburgh), the Court was equally con-
cerned with the fact that the state was using misleading disclosures as 
it was with the fact that the state was attempting to persuade women 
to choose childbirth.  For example, the Court labeled the disclosure 
that “abortion is a major surgical procedure” as “dubious.”83  Further, 
the Court wrote, the provision that “proceeds to describe numerous 
possible physical and psychological complications of abortion, is a 
‘parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly danger-
ous procedure.”84  In his dissent in Thornburgh, Justice White reaffirmed 
the view that Akron was a case about ensuring that informed consent 
provisions do not manipulate or mislead women:  “I have no quarrel 
with the general proposition, for which I read Akron to stand, that a 
campaign of state-promulgated disinformation cannot be justified in 
the name of ‘informed consent’ or ‘freedom of choice.’”85  Thus, Ak-
ron stands for the proposition that informed consent disclosures, at a 
minimum, cannot seek to manipulate or mislead a woman making 
her constitutionally-protected choice.  The nonmisleading standard, 
first remarked upon in Akron, protects a woman’s autonomy by ensur-
 
 80 428 U.S. 52, 65–67 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 
462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8). 
 82 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 443–44). 
 83 Akron, 462 U.S. at 444. 
 84 Id. at 444–45 (emphasis added). 
 85 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 800 (White, J., dissenting). 
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ing that her decisional process is not inappropriately manipulated by 
the state, a right more prominently featured in Casey than in Roe.  
The concern regarding misleading and manipulative disclosures, 
however, dropped out of the analysis in Thornburgh because the re-
quirements, although intended to dissuade, did not use the same mis-
leading tactics to do so.86 
Thus, the Court’s prior informed consent law relied on three 
principles:  (1) the state cannot place the doctor in an “uncomforta-
ble straightjacket”87; (2) the state cannot use informed consent disclo-
sure to seek to persuade women to continue their pregnancies88; and 
(3) the state cannot use misleading information in informed consent 
to manipulate women’s choices89.  The way that the Court ap-
proached the informed consent question in Casey is representative of 
the Casey compromise overall.  It rejected the two prior absolutist ra-
tionales derived from Roe’s fundamental right/trimester framework 
and therefore created significant space for expressive informed con-
sent regulation.  However, it implemented the third rationale, the 
nonmisleading standard of Akron, to protect women’s autonomy.  
The Court made clear that the doctor receives no special constitu-
tional protection in the abortion context: 
The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the two more 
general rights under which the abortion right is justified:  the right to 
make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.  On its own, 
the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it re-
ceives in other contexts.90 
Further, Casey made clear that the state is no longer prohibited from 
expressing a preference for childbirth through informed consent 
 
 86  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760–61 (Seven explicit kinds of information must be delivered to 
the woman at least twenty-four hours before her consent is given, and five of these must 
be presented by the woman's physician.  The five are:  (a) the name of the physician who 
will perform the abortion, (b) the “fact that there may be detrimental physical and psy-
chological effects which are not accurately foreseeable,” (c) the “particular medical risks 
associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed,” (d) the probable ges-
tational age, and (e) the “medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.” The 
remaining two categories are (f) the “fact that medical assistance benefits may be availa-
ble for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,” and (g) the “fact that the father is li-
able to assist” in the child's support, “even in instances where the father has offered to pay 
for the abortion.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)-(2) (1988). The woman also must be 
informed that materials printed and supplied by the Commonwealth that describe the fe-
tus and that list agencies offering alternatives to abortion are available for her review.). 
 87  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88  Id. 
 89  Akron, 462 U.S. at 444–45. 
 90 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
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regulations:  “[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of 
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at en-
suring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing 
the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”91  
Nonetheless, the Court maintained and elucidated the nonmislead-
ing requirement that originated in Akron:  “If the information the 
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not 
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”92  The opinion is 
explicit in explaining that it was overruling Akron and Thornburgh only 
insofar as those cases struck down informed consent provisions that 
mandated the dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading infor-
mation.93  The truthful and nonmisleading requirement reinforced 
the Court’s earlier holding that regulations must be designed to “in-
form . . . , not hinder,” a woman’s decision-making.94  Thus, the truth-
ful and nonmisleading standard is part and parcel with, and acts to 
implement, the undue burden standard’s underlying principle:  the 
protection of women’s autonomy. 
The compromise is also made visible by the ways in which Casey’s 
standard on informed consent deviates from, but also tacks back to, 
traditional informed consent principles.  In both medical ethics and 
common law, informed consent’s primary goal is to provide patients 
with sufficient information to enable the patients to make their own 
medical decisions;95 patient autonomy is the central principle from 
which informed consent doctrine proceeds.96  In contrast, the abor-
tion informed consent regulations have at least the additional goal of 
expressing the state’s preference for childbirth over abortion; this is a 
 
 91 Id. at 883. 
 92 Id. at 882. 
 93 See id. (“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the 
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information 
about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and 
the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent 
with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are over-
ruled.”). 
 94 Id. at 877. 
 95 See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey:  Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process, 4 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 808 (1996) (“In theory, the standard for judging the ade-
quacy of the information given is whether the particular patient has the information she 
needs to make an informed and intelligent decision about treatment.”). 
 96 See id. (“This narrow autonomy model largely governs medical decisionmaking today 
through the doctrine of informed consent, which undergirds the law of the doctor-
patient relationship.”); see also SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, AUTONOMY, CONSENT, AND THE LAW 
42 (2010) (arguing that informed consent requires providing patients with relevant and 
sufficient information for decision-making purposes, and that this obligation is a hall-
mark of the shift towards greater respect for patient autonomy). 
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purpose inherently distinct from enabling patient autonomy.  Fur-
ther, the form of the regulations approved in Casey differs from ordi-
nary informed consent law.  Typical informed consent law for a med-
ical procedure is governed by the common law doctrine, which 
requires disclosure that conforms to the standard of the profession 
(or, in a minority of jurisdictions, that provides the information a rea-
sonable patient would want), and not by specific disclosures mandat-
ed by the state.97  Finally, the scope of the mandated disclosures 
reaches beyond the ordinary scope of informed consent.  Ordinary 
informed consent law is narrowly focused on the patient’s under-
standing of the risks and consequences of the medical procedure to 
the patient’s body and rarely addresses social or personal context.98 
Critics argue that this deviation from conventional informed con-
sent principles, sanctioned by Casey, treats women “as decision-makers 
less capable than other competent adults,” in need of state assistance 
and guidance in ascertaining the appropriate advice from their phy-
sicians that other adults do not require.99  To some extent, the fact 
that the Court approved special informed consent procedures for 
abortion that do not exist for any other medical procedures could be 
said to “perpetuate[] the stereotypical notion of the indecisiveness of 
women . . . [and reflect] stereotypical assumptions that women 
choose to obtain abortions carelessly.”100  However, the extent to 
which a regulation reflects these sex stereotypes will depend on the 
manner in which the regulation seeks to structure the informed con-
sent process.  Where the regulation truly provides for detailed but ev-
enhanded and non-manipulative disclosures regarding the risks, con-
sequences, and alternatives to abortion, the affront to women’s 
decision-making capacity is far less than where the state seeks to use 
any means, however coercive or manipulative, to “correct” a woman’s 
choice to seek an abortion. 
This is where the Court’s intervention—by only allowing truthful, 
nonmisleading disclosures designed to inform, not hinder, a woman’s 
decision—is central to preserving the integrity of a woman’s right to 
choose even while allowing for pro-life legislation.  The nonmislead-
ing standard also returns abortion informed consent provisions at 
 
 97 Goldstein, supra note 95, at 808. 
 98 See id. at 815 (“This enlarged vision of the patient’s interests does not represent medical-
legal standard practice . . . .”). 
 99 Manian, supra note 69, at 252. 
100 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference:  Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1902 
(1995)). 
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least partially to traditional informed consent principles.  The state 
can deviate from the norm by having the goal of expressing a prefer-
ence for childbirth but only where it also has the goal of informing 
and enabling patient autonomy. 
How, Professor Maya Manian asks, can a disclosure be “nonmis-
leading” but also “biased in one direction?”101  Her question is rhetor-
ical, but actually has an answer in Casey.  The disclosures in Casey 
demonstrate the type of pro-life informed consent legislation that 
does not violate the nonmisleading requirement by misdirecting a 
woman’s dialogue with her doctor.  With respect to the medical risks 
of abortion, the Pennsylvania law required disclosure of the risks of 
both abortion and childbirth.102  The Pennsylvania law also required 
disclosure of the gestational age of the fetus and information about 
child support and adoption options.103  While mandating these types 
of disclosures about abortion alternatives channels the expression of 
a state preference for childbirth, the Casey disclosures do not inher-
ently mislead a woman’s decision-making process.  Presumably, a 
woman is already informed about the option of abortion at this stage 
in the process (and the regulations require further disclosures about 
the nature of the procedures), so disclosure of other options is not 
misleading.  Further, it is unclear what other information should fair-
ly “counterbalance” the disclosure of the gestational age of the fetus.  
Thus, while the Court did approve the expression of a state prefer-
ence for childbirth in informed consent regulation, it importantly did 
not condone disclosures that would mislead and manipulate a wom-
an’s decision-making.  Read in light of the overarching aims of the 
Casey opinion—respecting the state’s interest in regulating abortion 
and maintaining women’s ultimate autonomy—the truthful and 
nonmisleading requirement plays a key role in limiting informed 
consent regulation to those disclosures that do not impair the goal of 
protecting autonomous decision-making. 
This Subpart has traced the limits Casey imposes on informed con-
sent regulation and demonstrated that they are pivotal to negotiating 
the tension between the competing goals of the undue burden stand-
ard.  As Robert Goldstein writes, “[i]n a regime in which the woman 
has the ultimate choice, it naturally follows that the informed consent 
process plays a centrally important role in protecting the woman and 
the integrity of her decision.”104  Casey threaded the needle in its ap-
 
101 Manian, supra note 69, at 251. 
102 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). 
103 Id. 
104 Goldstein, supra note 95, at 806. 
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proach to informed consent regulation.  Arguably, informed consent 
regulation expressing a preference for childbirth is more respectful 
of women’s autonomy than other forms of pro-life legislation.  Gold-
stein explains that the Court’s holding required opponents of Roe to 
regulate “in a straightforward and honest manner, rather than sur-
reptitiously by means of a regulatory tax on the abortion decision.”105  
However, by allowing the state to insert itself into a woman’s decision-
making process, the dangers of abuse, confusion, and manipulation 
threaten to undermine the value of decisional autonomy within the 
Casey compromise more so than any administrative hurdle to abor-
tion the state could impose.  Seen in this light, the truthful and non-
misleading requirement is the lynchpin to any coherent protection 
for women’s decisional autonomy in Casey.  The next Part outlines 
the most recent forms of abortion regulation in the post-Casey era; in 
particular, it focuses on a new generation of doctor-patient dialogue 
regulations, different in kind than those approved in Casey, and thus 
deserving of close scrutiny under the above framework. 
II.  TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ABORTION REGULATION 
Part I established that Casey imposed autonomy (and equality) 
preserving constraints on the state’s newfound ability to regulate 
abortion to express respect for potential life prior to viability.  How-
ever, since 1992, states have passed increasingly aggressive antiabor-
tion regulation, different in kind from the regulations approved in 
Casey, and thus requiring close constitutional scrutiny.  First, this Part 
outlines in broad scope the antiabortion strategies that have emerged 
in designing antiabortion regulations and their effects on the consti-
tutional landscape of abortion regulation today.  Next, it provides a 
comprehensive review of the new forms of doctor-patient dialogue 
regulation, which this Article terms “dissuasion laws.” 
A.  Incrementalism and the Women-Protective Antiabortion Argument 
After the failed efforts in the 1980s to pass a Human Life constitu-
tional amendment, the mainstream pro-life movement—most notably 
the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)—shifted strategies.106  
 
105 Id. at 806–07. 
106 See generally Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson to Whom it May 
Concern (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://americanrtl.org/files/Documents/nrtlbopp2
0070807memo.pdf (outlining the advantages and disadvantages of various nationwide 
pro-life arguments and proposing a general pro-life strategy). 
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Instead of seeking the immediate overturning of Roe, either in the 
Court or through a constitutional amendment, pro-life advocates fo-
cused on an incrementalist strategy for eliminating the abortion 
right.107  The incrementalist strategy involves the passage of a wide ar-
ray of abortion restrictions short of abortion bans, serving a number 
of purposes.  First, they serve an expressive purpose; through these 
restrictions the pro-life community expresses its disapproval of the le-
gality of abortion.  Further, the regulations—from mandatory coun-
seling to ultrasound requirements to specific procedure bans—make 
access to abortion more difficult.  Finally, the incrementalist strategy 
seeks to use these incremental regulations to slowly undermine the 
legal foundations of the abortion right.108  Victor Rosenblum and 
Thomas Marzen, in an article titled Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade 
Through the Courts, suggest that incremental regulation can be used to 
expand the Court’s recognition of the state interest in the unborn 
and widen the state’s interest in maternal health at all stages of preg-
nancy, and thus slowly eliminate the underlying rationales for Roe.109 
By upholding significant incrementalist regulation for the first 
time, Casey self-consciously gave the pro-life community a greater op-
portunity to pursue this type of legislation.  The National Right to 
Life Committee remains committed to this approach and has rejected 
 
   Alongside the incrementalist strategy, some antiabortion advocates have refocused 
their energies on challenging Roe directly by passing abortion bans.  In 2012 and 2013, 
five states passed abortion bans in direct contradiction to Roe:  Arkansas passed a twelve-
week ban, North Dakota passed a six-week ban, and three other states passed twenty-week 
bans.  See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE LEGISLATION AND POLICIES ENACTED IN 2013 
RELATED TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.guttmacher
.org/statecenter/updates/2013Newlaws.pdf; Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 
2012 State Policy Review, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
updates/2012/statetrends42012.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).  But challenges to these 
laws in the lower courts have been, predictably in light of Roe and Casey, successful.  The 
Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to reconsider Casey by denying Arizo-
na’s petition for certiorari in Horne v. Isaacson, a Ninth Circuit case striking down Arizo-
na’s twenty-week ban.  134 S. Ct. 905 (2014).  Thus, commentators have predicted that 
mainstream advocates will continue to focus primarily on an incrementalist approach.  See 
Natalie Villacorta, Shifting Strategies for State Abortion Battles in 2014, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/abortion-battles-shifting-strategy-
101811.html. 
107 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 106, at 6 (noting that incrementalist efforts will “not only 
keep the abortion issue alive and change hearts and minds for long-term benefit, but they 
also translate into more disfavor for all abortions, which in turn reduces abortions”); see 
also Victor G. Rosenblum & Thomas J. Marzen, Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade Through 
the Courts in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:  REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE 
COURTS 195, 195–96 (Dennis J. Horan, Edward R. Grant & Paige C. Cunningham eds., 
1987); Siegel, supra note 71, at 1706–13; Smith, supra note 8, at 389–93. 
108 Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 107, at 195–96. 
109 Id. 
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more absolutist approaches espoused by organizations like Person-
hoodUSA110—which advocates for personhood initiatives and abor-
tion bans, designed to prompt an outright Roe challenge—as prema-
ture.111  The forthcoming survey of recently enacted abortion 
legislation, and the limited judicial reaction to regulation thus far, 
demonstrates that this has been a “remarkably consistent and success-
ful strategy”112 on behalf of the pro-life community.  In 2011, antia-
bortion legislators passed a record number ninety-two abortion re-
strictions in the states.113  In 2013, seventy abortion restrictions were 
enacted, the second most in any year.114  In sum, more antiabortion 
laws were passed between 2011 and 2013 than in the entire previous 
decade.115 
In addition to pursuing an incrementalist approach, the pro-life 
movement has adopted new rhetoric; it has developed a “women-
protective” discourse for describing the harms of abortion.  As Siegel 
comprehensively illustrates in her recent work, antiabortion advo-
cates no longer solely focus on the protection of the unborn, but ra-
ther, in response to decades of dialogue with the women’s rights 
movement, also focus on how the restriction of abortion supposedly 
protects women.116  “[I]n a straight-up battle between fetal interests 
and women’s interests,” pro-life advocates concluded, “the woman 
would win”;117 so they reimagined the terms of the argument.  The 
crux of their position is that abortion is necessarily harmful to wom-
en, and thus, restriction of abortion is necessary to protect women.  
The antiabortion community has sought to sweep in medical, as well 
as philosophical, arguments to support its claim by proving the exist-
ence of “post-abortion syndrome” (PAS), severe psychological effects 
 
110 PersonhoodUSA has led the efforts to pass “personhood” statutes, amendments, and bal-
lot initiatives that define personhood as beginning at fertilization and thus directly chal-
lenge Roe.  See What is Personhood?, PERSONHOODUSA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/
about-us/what-is-personhood (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
111 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 106, at 6 (expressing concern that entertaining more ex-
treme positions would be “would undermine public support for the pro-life position”). 
112 Smith, supra note 8, at 389. 
113 States Enact Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in 2011, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html. 
114 More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/
2014/01/02/index.html. 
115 Id. 
116 See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:  Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1649–50 (2008). 
117 Smith, supra note 8, at 393. 
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following abortion, as well as other detrimental physical effects of 
abortion (such as a link between abortion and breast cancer).118 
Generally, the mainstream medical community has rejected these 
claims.  For example, in the late 1980s, antiabortion leaders asked 
Ronald Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, a strong oppo-
nent of abortion, to document PAS and other negative physical ef-
fects of abortion.119  He refused based on the lack of medical evi-
dence.120 
Despite the dearth of established medical evidence, the fruits of 
this effort can be seen in many informed consent statutes discussed 
below, which often assert unsupported medical claims about the risks 
of abortion.  The early success of the joining of the strategies of in-
crementalism and the women-protective antiabortion argument can 
be seen in Gonzales v. Carhart.121  Although Carhart did not change the 
basic test or underlying principles of Casey,122 the opinion includes 
passages that clearly reflect the women-protective argument.123 
The shift in pro-life reasoning not only changes the political calcu-
lus of legislative moves but might also affect the constitutional land-
scape of abortion regulation.  Unpacking the logic of the women-
protective antiabortion argument, Siegel has demonstrated that the 
argument rests on sex-stereotypes and assumptions about women’s 
“natural role” in the family that our constitutional order has long re-
jected.124  The logic of the women-protective argument proceeds as 
 
118 See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 116, at 1657–64 (discussing the history of the 
idea of “post-abortion syndrome”). 
119 Id. at 1662. 
120 Id. at 1663. 
121 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 
in part relying on the  women-protective arguments against abortion). 
122 See David J. Garrow, Significant Risks:  Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Law, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (noting that Carhart “reaffirmed the continuing validity and ap-
plicability of Casey’s decisive undue burden test”); Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?:  
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
(Online) 1, 13 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357506 (“There is 
nothing in the [Carhart] opinion renouncing two of the important limitations the plurali-
ty in Casey placed on the Court’s approval of statutes mandating that women receive cer-
tain information before they obtain an abortion.”). 
123 E.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child.  The Act recognizes this reality as well.  
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. . . . While we 
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained.”). 
124 See Siegel, supra note 116, at 1688 (“The claim is that by restricting all women, govern-
ment can free women to be the mothers they naturally are.  Woman-protective antiabor-
tion argument is gender-paternalist in just the sense that the old sex-based protective la-
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follows:  (1) abortion is always harmful to women; (2) thus, when 
women have abortions it is not because of their free choice but rather 
because they have been manipulated, misled, and coerced; therefore, 
(3) restriction of abortion will protect women.125  Constitutionally 
suspect assumptions about women, Siegel argues, underlie each step 
in the analysis.  First, the assumptions that women are unable to make 
choices in their own interests, and further, that the solution is to re-
strict their choice (steps two and three), contemplate women as ob-
jects of limited capacity.126  As Siegel writes, it is reminiscent of “the 
classic form of protection the common-law tradition offered women, 
in which restricting women’s agency was the means chosen to protect 
and free them:  ‘an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in prac-
tical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage’”127—a com-
mon law tradition that our modern equal protection jurisprudence 
has rejected.128 
Moreover, the prior assumption (step one), that abortion always 
harms women, is also rooted in constitutionally problematic gender 
assumptions.  As discussed above, the medical community has reject-
ed most claims regarding the harmful effects, both psychological and 
physical, of abortion.  Thus, the assumption that abortion harms 
women is primarily rooted in the antiabortion community’s norma-
tive priors about the place of women in our society.129  David Rear-
don, a leader of the women-protective argument, states,  “While the 
research we are doing is necessary to document abortion’s harm, 
good moral reasoning helps us to anticipate the results.”130  As Siegel’s 
work demonstrates, the argument relies on the belief that abortion 
must always harm women because a woman’s natural role is mother.  
Reardon argues,  “If there is a single principle, then, which lies at the 
 
bor legislation was.  It restricts women’s choices to free them to perform their natural 
role as mothers.” (emphasis omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion:  An 
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1036–38 
(2007) [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] (“Woman-protectionist arguments for regulating 
abortion draw persuasive force from familiar stereotypes about women’s agency. . . . [I]t 
continues to reason from stereotypes about women’s roles.”). 
125 Siegel, New Politics, supra note 124, at 1017–22. 
126 Id. at 1031–36. 
127 Siegel, supra note 71, at 1778–79 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). 
128 Siegel, supra note 71, at 1778–79.  
129 Siegel, New Politics, supra note 124, at 1036–40. 
130 Id. at 1021 (citing Tracking the Effects of Abortion on Women:  Interview with David 
Reardon of the Elliot Institute, ZENIT (May 12, 2003), available at http://www.zenit.org/
english/visualizza.phtml?sid=35425). 
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heart of the pro-women/pro-life agenda, it would have to be this:  the 
best interests of the child and the mother are always joined.”131 
The foregoing sets the political stage for understanding the pro-
liferation of state abortion regulation in the twenty years since Casey.  
States have passed wide-ranging incrementalist abortion regulations.  
They have passed limited prohibitions:  from bans on the “partial-
birth” abortion procedure,132 to late-term bans that precede the viabil-
ity line,133 to bans on abortions sought for race or sex-selective rea-
sons.134  States have imposed lengthy waiting periods with two-trip re-
quirements,135 required physician presence for the administration of a 
 
131 Id. at 1019 (emphasis omitted) (quoting DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE:  A 
HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED NATION 5–6 (1996)). 
132 Partial-birth abortion is now banned federally alongside thirty–two state bans, although 
only nineteen state bans are currently in effect.  GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN 
BRIEF:  BANS ON “PARTIAL-BIRTH” ABORTION (2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.
org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).  
   The partial birth abortion ban is credited as a significant rhetorical success for pro-
life politics.  The ban focused the popular abortion debate on late-term abortions.  Jenny 
Westberg’s graphic cartoon illustrations of the procedure were “front and center” in the 
ongoing debate.  Jenny Westberg, D & X:  Grim Technology for Abortion’s Older Victims, LIFE 
ADVOCATE, http://lifeadvocate.org/arc/dx.htm; see also SARAH DUBOW, OURSELVES, 
UNBORN 169 (2011) (discussing the controversial Westberg cartoons). 
133 In 2010, Nebraska passed an abortion ban beginning at twenty weeks’ gestation based on 
the assertion that a fetus can feel pain at this point in the pregnancy, a point far earlier 
than commonly accepted notions of viability.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,106 (2011).  Since 
then, eleven other states have followed suit; three of those laws have been enjoined.  
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  STATE POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS (Feb. 
1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf. 
134 In 2010, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Illinois all passed laws barring the practice of sex-
selective abortion.  See Arizona Abortion Law:  Requiring an Affidavit Excluding Race or Sex as 
Reasons, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/03/arizona-abortion-law-requiring-an-affidavit-excluding-
race-or-sex-as-reasons.html.  In March 2011, Arizona passed legislation prohibiting pro-
viders from performing abortions sought for sex-selective or race-selective reasons.  Id.  
Recently, a court dismissed a lawsuit challenging Arizona’s law, holding that the groups 
did not have standing to bring the challenge.  Katie McDonough, Court Dismisses Lawsuit 
Over Arizona’s “Race- and Sex-Selective” Abortion Ban,” SALON (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:54 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/04/court_dismisses_lawsuit_over_arizonas_race_and_
sex_selective_abortion_ban/.  In 2013, North Dakota and Kansas also passed legislation 
prohibiting sex-selective abortions.  Bob Christie, Arizona Race and Sex-Selective Abortion 
Ban Draws ACLU Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2013 5:51 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/29/arizona-abortion-ban-race-sex_n_3355493.html. 
135 Twenty-six states have twenty-four-hour (or shorter) waiting periods, which require wom-
en to receive counseling regarding abortion one full day before the procedure.  
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR 
ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_MWPA.pdf.  South Dakota’s and Utah’s waiting periods are seventy-two hours.  Id.; 
H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011).  Ten states’ informed consent laws require 
in-person counseling as well as a waiting period and therefore require patients to make 
two trips to the clinic.  GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135. 
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medication abortion,136 and subjected clinics to onerous technical 
regulations137 (sometimes threatening to close down all the abortion 
clinics in a state).138  For minors, most states have parental notification 
or consent laws.139  Further, states shape access to abortion through 
public welfare and private insurance regulations:  many states (and 
the federal government) limit Medicaid access to abortion to cases of 
rape, incest, or life endangerment,140 impose “gag rules” that bar pub-
lic organizations from providing abortion counseling or referrals,141 
and restrict the private market for abortion insurance.142 
As the non-exhaustive list above demonstrates, the ways in which 
the states intervene in matters of abortion access are diverse.  All of 
these regulations must be analyzed under Casey’s undue burden 
framework to ensure that the balance between interests is main-
tained.  For the purposes of this Article, I focus on the most recent 
generation of doctor-patient dialogue regulations, which I term dis-
suasion laws.  These laws, which regulate the content of this dialogue, 
directly implicate the truthful and nonmisleading standard (which 
 
136 See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  MEDICATION ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (“[Fourteen] 
states require that the clinician providing a medication abortion be physically present 
during the procedure, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine to prescribe medica-
tion for abortion remotely.”). 
137 For example, at least twenty-five states currently restrict abortion care to hospitals or oth-
er specialized facilities.  Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), NARAL PRO-
CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/abortion/trap-laws.
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
138 There is an ongoing court battle to keep Mississippi’s last remaining abortion clinic open, 
which Mississippi’s 2012 regulation threatens to shut down.  Emily Crockett, Mississippi 
Gov. Phil Bryant:  ‘My Goal is to End Abortion in Mississippi,’ RH REALITY CHECK (Jan. 31, 
2014, 5:25 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/01/31/mississippi-gov-phil-
bryant-goal-end-abortion-mississippi/.  Similarly, in 2011, Kansas passed a TRAP law, the 
restrictions of which threatened to close down nearly every abortion provider in the state; 
however, the law was enjoined before it went into effect.  Kate Sheppard, Kansas to Shut 
Down All But One Abortion Clinic Friday, MOTHER JONES (June 30, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://
motherjones.com/mojo/2011/06/kansas-shut-down-all-abortion-clinics-friday; Hodes & 
Nauser v. Moser, No. 11-02365, 2011 WL 4553061, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011). 
139 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’ 
ABORTIONS (Mar. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_PIMA.pdf. 
140 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (Feb. 1, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf; Hyde Amendment 
to the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§ 507–08, 802–03, 123 Stat. 595 
(2009). 
141 Counseling Bans & Gag Rules, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.
prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/gag_rules.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
142 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  RESTRICTING INSURANCE COVERAGE OF 
ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
_RICA.pdf. 
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implements in part the undue burden framework) that is the focus of 
this Article.  Different in kind than the content regulations involved 
in Casey, these dissuasion laws require close scrutiny under the truth-
ful and nonmisleading standard to preserve Casey’s compromise. 
B.  The First and Second Generations of Doctor-Patient Dialogue Regulations:  
Informed Consent and Dissuasion 
The preceding Subpart provides the landscape of abortion regula-
tion in which laws regulating doctor-patient counseling arise.  Casey 
upheld a number of doctor-patient mandated disclosures.  The Penn-
sylvania law in Casey required doctors to inform women of (1) the na-
ture of the procedure, (2) the health risks of abortion and childbirth, 
and (3) the probable gestational age of the fetus.143  The doctor was 
also required to offer the woman state-created materials with infor-
mation about medical assistance for childbirth, child support, and 
adoption agencies.144  In the years directly after Casey, many states un-
exceptionally adopted laws mirroring the Pennsylvania law.  Pro-
choice advocates object to this type of scripted disclosure, which fo-
cuses on the fetus and abortion alternatives, on several grounds:  it 
forces doctors outside their area of expertise, intrudes in the doctor-
patient relationship, and introduces the state’s ideological position 
into a woman’s private choice.  However, as discussed above in Sub-
part I.B.2, the disclosures required by this first generation of doctor-
patient counseling regulation pose little risk of manipulating the in-
formed consent process to disrupt a woman’s autonomous decision-
making by misleading, confusing, or overwhelming her.  After all, in 
Casey, the doctor was required to discuss the health risks of both abor-
tion and childbirth and only had to offer material about alternative 
options. 
Since then, states have passed laws regulating doctor-patient coun-
seling that differ in kind from those approved in Casey.  This Article 
labels the new generation of regulation “dissuasion” laws because, 
while they share the goal of dissuasion with the first generation, they 
no longer necessarily incorporate the respect for patient autonomy 
central to any law properly called an informed consent regulation.  
Dissuasion laws carry the risk of undermining the second goal of Ca-
sey—protection of a woman’s ultimate autonomy in decision-making.  
While this Article refers to these laws as “second-generation,” they of-
ten bear a striking resemblance to the old law in Akron, which the 
 
143 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). 
144 Id. 
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Court deemed misleading, analyzed more closely in Part IV.  There-
fore, these laws require close scrutiny under the undue burden 
framework, and particularly the truthful and nonmisleading standard 
that the Court implemented to protect women’s autonomy.  The re-
mainder of this Subpart describes the variety of dissuasion laws now 
operative in many states. 
1.  Medically Incorrect and Misleading Risk Disclosures 
States have passed laws that go far beyond the Pennsylvania law’s 
requirement that a doctor discuss the general risks of abortion.  
States have mandated very specific risk disclosures by physicians 
and/or included discussion of specific risks in state-created and 
mandatorily distributed materials.  In many cases the laws clearly mis-
represent the risks of abortion.  At least five states inaccurately assert 
a link between abortion and breast cancer, despite general agree-
ment in the medical literature that no such link exists.145  Likewise, six 
states inaccurately portray the risk of an effect on a woman’s future 
fertility.146  Other states raise the specter of infertility in their materi-
als, although the small type accurately states that there is no proven 
appreciable risk.147  Where states misrepresent, or misleadingly pre-
sent, the risks of abortion, the disclosures can disrupt the ability of 
women to properly assess her choices and make an autonomous, in-
formed decision.  The core principle of informed consent is to pro-
vide the appropriate information in order to enable patient autono-
my.148  When the information is untruthful or misleading, it cannot be 
properly so-termed. 
a.  PATSD and Negative Mental Health Effects Disclosures 
The women-protective argument hinges on the idea that abortion 
harms women psychologically.  As discussed above, this belief is pri-
marily premised on the intuition that a woman’s best interests will al-
 
145 GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135. 
146 Id. 
147 See, e.g., IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 10 
(2013), available at http://www.state.in.us/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_
Brochure.pdf (containing the header “POTENTIAL DANGER TO A SUBSEQUENT 
PREGNANCY AND INFERTILITY”). 
148 Goldstein, supra note 95, at 808 (“This narrow autonomy model largely governs medical 
decisionmaking today through the doctrine of informed consent, which undergirds the 
law of the doctor-patient relationship.”); see also MCLEAN, supra note 96, at 42 (2010) (ar-
guing that informed consent requires providing patients with relevant and sufficient in-
formation for decision-making purposes). 
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ways be aligned with those of her unborn child.149  However, psycho-
logical studies have consistently refuted the concept of “post abortion 
traumatic stress syndrome” (PATSD).  For example, a recent com-
prehensive review by the National Collaborating Centre for Mental 
Health of previous peer-reviewed studies concluded that abortion 
does not raise a woman’s mental health risk.150 
Nonetheless, at least eight states still inform women in their man-
dated materials of exclusively negative psychological consequences of 
abortion.151  For example, the West Virginia materials state: 
Many women suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [Syndrome] fol-
lowing abortion.  PTSD is a psychological dysfunction resulting from a 
traumatic experience.  Symptoms of PTSD include:  guilt[,] depres-
sion[,] nightmares[,] fear and anxiety[,] alcohol and drug abuse[,] 
flashbacks[,] grief[,] suicidal thoughts or acts[,] sexual dysfunction[,] 
eating disorders[,] low self-esteem[, and] chronic relationship prob-
lems.152 
These laws have largely either been approved in litigation or gone 
unchallenged. South Dakota’s dissuasion law goes further; it requires 
physicians to inform women of an increased risk of suicide.153  A panel 
of the Eighth Circuit initially enjoined that requirement;154 however, 
the Circuit took the case en banc and reversed, upholding the suicide 
risk disclosure.155 
b.  Fetal Pain and Survival Laws 
Twelve states now either require a physician to disclose infor-
mation about a fetus’s ability to feel pain or include such information 
in the state-mandated materials.156  The number of states providing 
such information to women seeking abortions has more than dou-
bled in the past five years.157  The laws among these states vary in their 
 
149 See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
150 NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL 
HEALTH (2011), available at http://www.nccmh.org.uk/reports/ABORTION_REPORT_
WEB%20FINAL.pdf. 
151 GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135. 
152 Abortion Methods & Medical Risks, W.V. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., http://www. 
wvdhhr.org/wrtk/abortioninformation.asp#Abortion_Risks (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
153 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2013). 
154 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 
(8th Cir.  2011). 
155 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
156 GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 135. 
157 Compare id. (noting that twelve states require including “information” that the fetus can 
feel pain), with Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent:  The 
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particulars.  However, none convey the generally accepted medical 
consensus on the issue.  A 2005 American Medical Association report 
indicates that the structures necessary to feel pain develop between 
twenty-three and thirty weeks gestation.158  However, even when these 
structures develop, a fetus will not feel pain until the structures can 
transmit information and the fetus can interpret it.  Based on the lit-
tle data available, it is likely this does not occur until thirty weeks.159 
Fetal pain laws do not reflect this general consensus.  For exam-
ple, Georgia’s materials state, 
By 20 weeks gestation, the unborn child has the physical structures neces-
sary to experience pain.  There is evidence that by 20 weeks gestation 
unborn children evade certain stimuli in a manner which in an infant or 
an adult would be interpreted to be a response to pain.  Anesthesia is 
routinely administered to unborn children who are 20 weeks gestational 
age or older who undergo prenatal surgery.160 
Not only does the above not reflect medical consensus, but it may al-
so insert a red herring in a woman’s analysis of the facts of fetal pain.  
Medical evidence shows that the anesthesia during the procedure is 
used for reasons entirely unrelated to fetal pain.161  In South Dakota, 
the materials do not indicate the advanced age required for fetuses to 
feel pain, implicitly suggesting that a fetus can feel pain at any stage 
of pregnancy:  “Findings from some studies suggest that the unborn 
fetus may feel physical pain.”162  The Texas materials suggest ability to 
feel pain may occur as early as twelve weeks gestation.163 
Along similar lines, some states require disclosures that inaccu-
rately portray the point at which a fetus becomes viable.  In Alabama, 
after nineteen weeks, a doctor must inform a woman seeking an abor-
tion that (1) the child may be able to survive, (2) she has “the right to 
request the physician to use the method of abortion that is most likely 
to preserve the life of the unborn child,” and (3) if the child is born 
 
Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 
6, 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html 
(noting that five states had such a requirement as of September 2006). 
158 Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain:  A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, J. AM. 
MED. ASSOC., 947, 947 (2005), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/294/8/
947.full.pdf+html. 
159 Id. at 952. 
160 GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES. DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, ABORTION:  A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW, 
available at http://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/
PatientEducationBookEN.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
161 Lee et al., supra note 158, at 947. 
162 Induced Abortion Methods & Risks, S.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://doh.sd.gov/abortion/
induced-abortion-methods-risks.aspx?#Risks (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
163 TEX. DEPT. OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW (2003), available at 
http:// www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf. 
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alive, the attending physician is legally required to take all steps to 
save the life of the child.164  Despite serious questions regarding the 
medical validity of these statements, this provision was upheld in fed-
eral court.165 
The purpose of the fetal pain laws is to encourage women to re-
consider their choice to have an abortion based on the possibility that 
the fetus can feel pain.  If these laws reflected the accepted medical 
consensus, they would mirror the Casey regulation and pass muster 
under the undue burden standard even though their purpose is dis-
suasive.  However, when the laws misrepresent, or misleadingly pre-
sent, medical evidence, they can disrupt patient autonomy.  Thus, fe-
tal pain laws demonstrate the importance of enforcing Casey’s 
truthful and nonmisleading standard to ensure that states respect pa-
tient autonomy while furthering the goal of protecting unborn life. 
2.  Overwhelming Disclosures:  The Endless Disclosure Strategy 
Dissuasion laws passed in Nebraska in 2010 and South Dakota in 
2011 would have required doctors to disclose to patients an enor-
mous amount of information related to the risks of abortion, above 
and beyond any ordinary informed consent dialogue.  The Nebraska 
law, read literally, required doctors to screen women for every “risk 
factor,” defined broadly, ever reported to be associated with abortion 
and ever published in any peer-reviewed study anywhere at any time, 
and disclose any “complications” associated with those risk factors.166  
Because the law did not impose any limitations on these disclosures, 
it would have required disclosures of studies even where the findings 
were irrelevant to the patient, outdated, or medically disproved by 
subsequent research.  The District Court of Nebraska granted a pre-
liminary injunction, finding that the law was impossible to comply 
with and its purpose was to ban abortion in violation of Casey.167  The 
Attorney General agreed to settle the case and a permanent injunc-
tion issued.168 
The 2011 South Dakota law enacted nearly identical requirements 
to the Nebraska bill except it limited the studies to those published in 
 
164 ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2010). 
165 Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
166 L.B. 594, 101st Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2010). 
167 Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010). 
168 Stipulation to Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Planned Parenthood 
of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010) (No. 10CV03122), 2010 
WL 5758641. 
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English after 1972.169  Those changes likely rebut the “impossibility” 
claim Planned Parenthood made in Nebraska, but the law continues 
to require disclosure of an overwhelming amount of information, 
much of which may be unnecessary or misleading.  The District Court 
of South Dakota enjoined the provision on those grounds.170 
The Nebraska and South Dakota laws demonstrate how dissuasion 
laws can possibly mislead patients even without providing factually in-
correct information.  Even if the laws are tailored to ensure that no 
medically disproven or outdated studies must be disclosed, such laws 
may still mislead patients and undermine the autonomy principle of 
Casey.  Psychological studies demonstrate that our “overall capacity 
for mental effort is limited”171 and that an overload of information 
and complexity can lead to poor decision-making.  In the informed 
consent context, research shows that the more information that is 
provided to the patient, the less she will retain.172  Part of the goal of 
informed consent is to enable patients to make decisions by “se-
lect[ing] the information that is most material to the patient, and dis-
till[ing] it into a form that the patient is able to digest and under-
stand.”173  Therefore, at some critical point, the amount of 
information that the Nebraska and South Dakota dissuasion laws 
would have required would have likely disrupted the patient’s ability 
to make an autonomous and informed assessment of her options.  
Moreover, it is likely that patients would use other informed consent 
dialogues with doctors as a baseline for evaluating the abortion coun-
seling and “assume that their physician . . . would not give them in-
formation unless the physician thought [it] was important.”174  Since 
other informed consent dialogues involve vastly less extensive disclo-
sure of risks, patients would likely draw the incorrect inference that 
abortion is a particularly risky procedure. 
 
169 H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011). 
170 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 
2d 1048, 1073–75 (D.S.D. 2011).  In 2012, South Dakota amended this portion of the law, 
removing the challenged risk factor provision and replacing it with a provision requiring 
a more specific assessment of “preexisting risk factors associated with adverse psychologi-
cal outcomes.”  H.B. 1254, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012). 
171 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:  Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003). 
172 Declaration of Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. at 10, Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. 
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010) (No. 4:10-cv-3122). 
173 Id. at 9. 
174 Id. at 15–16. 
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3.  “Coerced Abortion Prevention” Screening Requirements 
In accordance with the rhetoric of the women-protection argu-
ment, several states have passed pro-life laws focused on preventing 
coerced abortions.  For example, in 2010, both Oklahoma and Ten-
nessee passed laws requiring abortion clinics to post signs indicating 
that women cannot be coerced into having an abortion against their 
wills.175  Other states have repeatedly considered laws that would re-
quire abortion providers to inform or counsel women on coercion; 
others have passed laws specifically prohibiting or criminalizing the 
coercion of abortion (although there is little doubt that this activity 
was already prohibited).176 
Most of these laws, of course, pose no significant threat to women 
seeking abortions.  However, some states have gone beyond requiring 
women to be informed of their right not to be coerced and have 
passed coercion screening requirements.  The 2010 Nebraska screen-
ing requirement required a physician to “[e]valuate[] the pregnant 
woman to identify if the pregnant woman ha[s] the perception of 
feeling pressured or coerced into seeking or consenting to an abor-
tion.”177  Along with the other provisions of this law, the screening re-
quirement has been permanently enjoined.178  South Dakota now has 
a similar coercion screening provision requiring a physician to 
[d]o an assessment of the pregnant mother’s circumstances to make a 
reasonable determination whether the pregnant mother’s decision to 
submit to an abortion is the result of any coercion or pressure from other 
persons.  In conducting that assessment, the physician shall obtain from 
the pregnant mother the age or approximate age of the father of the un-
born child, and the physician shall consider whether any disparity in age 
between the mother and father is a factor when determining whether the 
pregnant mother has been subjected to pressure, undue influence, or 
coercion.179 
 
175 AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2010 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 8 (2010), available 
at http://www.aul.org/2010/12/2010-state-legislative-session-report/. 
176 Id.; AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 2, 12–13 
(2012), available at http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012-Session-
Report-_FINAL_-_2_.pdf [hereinafter AMERICANS UNITED, 2012 REPORT]; AMERICANS 
UNITED FOR LIFE, 2013 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSION REPORT 14, 20–21 (2013), available at 
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2013-State-Session-Report.pdf [here-
inafter AMERICANS UNITED, 2013 REPORT]; Mailee R. Smith, 2011 State Legislative Report, 
AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE 63, 71 (2011), http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
state-legislative.pdf. 
177 Heineman, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. 
178 Stipulation to Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, supra note 168. 
179 H.B. 1254, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (1).  A very 
similar provision in this law’s predecessor bill, H.B. 1217, was initially enjoined.  H.B. 
1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011);. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
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Beyond the statute’s guidance on considering age difference, the 
statute provides little guidance on how physicians can make an objec-
tive determination as to coercion.  Further, it is unclear what the phy-
sician should or must do should she find “pressure, undue influence, 
or coercion.”  Depending on how the law is interpreted, the screen-
ing laws threaten to allow (or arguably force) the physician to veto 
the patient’s decision to have an abortion should the physician be-
lieve that pressure or coercion is at play. 
4.  Crisis Pregnancy Center Counseling 
Crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) are (often religious) antiabortion 
organizations that offer pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, and adoption 
services.  Numerous reports have chronicled CPCs’ use of both mis-
leading and coercive tactics in their efforts to ensure that a woman 
will not choose to have an abortion.180  Over the past decade, the visi-
bility of CPCs has increased and states have incorporated them into 
their pro-life legislative schemes.  A number of states now directly 
fund pregnancy care centers and other similar organizations.181  In fif-
teen of the twenty-nine states that allow production of “Choose Life” 
license plates, the proceeds go to CPCs or other antiabortion organi-
zations.182  In recent years, state legislatures have repeatedly adopted 
resolutions commending CPCs and their work.183  For example, in 
 
South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1069 (D.S.D. 2011) (holding that plain-
tiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the coercion requirement was 
unconstitutionally vague).  Pursuant to a joint stipulation, the slightly revised coercion 
provision was permitted to go into effect in July 2012.  See Judge Lets Part of South Dakota 
Abortion Law Take Effect, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 4, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.ksfy.com/
story/18895959/judge-lets-part-of-south-dakota-abortion-law-take-effect. 
180 See, e.g., Kathryn Joyce, Shotgun Adoption, THE NATION (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/shotgun-adoption  (chronicling the deceptive and 
coercive tactics of some CPCs pushing women to give their children up for adoption); 
Marc Kaufman, Pregnancy Centers Found to Give False Information on Abortion, WASH. POST 
(July 18, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/
AR20060717 01145.html (“The report said that 20 of 23 federally funded centers contact-
ed by staff investigators requesting information about an unintended pregnancy were told 
false or misleading information about the potential risks of an abortion.”); Julia Silver-
man, States React to Crisis Pregnancy Centers, WASH. POST (May 9, 2007, 7:23 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/.AR20070509
00291.html (“Some states, like Oregon and New York, are trying to increase oversight of 
the crisis pregnancy centers out of concern that the information they provide about abor-
tion may be biased or simply wrong.”);  
181 AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 REPORT, supra note 176. 
182 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  ‘CHOOSE LIFE’ LICENSE PLATES (2014), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_CLLP.pdf. 
183 AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2012 REPORT, supra note 176. 
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2013, these resolutions were passed in Kansas, Texas, and West Vir-
ginia.184 
Most importantly, the 2011 South Dakota informed consent law 
requires a woman to consult with a pregnancy center between her first 
mandatory counseling session with her physician and the perfor-
mance of the abortion.185  That pregnancy center is authorized to dis-
cuss alternative options and do its own independent assessment of 
whether or not the woman is being coerced.  As with other elements 
of this law, it is currently preliminarily enjoined pending ongoing lit-
igation.186 
5.  Ultrasound Laws 
An increasingly popular form of dissuasion law in this generation 
of doctor-patient regulation is the ultrasound requirement.  Nineteen 
ultrasound measures were introduced in state legislatures in 2011 
alone.187  Twenty-three states have laws that regulate the provision of 
ultrasounds for women seeking abortions (although two of the laws 
are permanently enjoined by court order).188  Most of these laws only 
require that the provider offer to perform an ultrasound or, if an ul-
trasound is provided, that the provider offer the woman the oppor-
tunity to view the image.189  But thirteen states have laws requiring 
that all women seeking abortions, no matter the stage of their preg-
nancy, undergo an ultrasound (although, once again, two are en-
joined).190  Five of those states have ultrasound laws that not only re-
quire all women to have an ultrasound, but also state that the 
provider must show each woman the image and describe it to her re-
gardless of her wishes.191  The Oklahoma and North Carolina laws are 
permanently enjoined;192 however, the Texas law is currently in force 
after the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the 
 
184 AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, 2013 REPORT, supra note 176, at 27. 
185 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (3)(a) (2013). 
186  Planned Parenthood v. Daugaard, 799 F.Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011). 
187 FRC ACTION, STATE PRO-FAMILY LEGISLATIVE REPORT FOR 2011 12 (2011), available at 
http:// downloads.frcaction.org/EF/EF11F15.pdf. 
188 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (2014), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (2012); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 63-1-738.3d (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§§ 171.012(4)–(5), 171.0122 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 253.10 (2014). 
192 GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 188. 
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law violated the physician’s First Amendment rights, 193 as are the 
Louisiana and Wisconsin laws.194 
6.  Purely Ideological Disclosures:  “Whole, Separate, Unique, Living 
Human Being” 
In 2005, South Dakota passed a law requiring doctors to inform 
women seeking abortions that an abortion ends the life of a “whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”195  The Eighth Circuit upheld 
this requirement against both Casey and First Amendment claims.196  
Since the disclosure was upheld in 2008, the law has been replicated 
in North Dakota, Missouri, and Kansas.197  Therefore, in four states, 
doctors must now tell women seeking abortions that abortions end 
the lives of whole, separate, unique, living human beings, a statement 
that essentially assumes the answer to the normative question under-
lying the abortion debate. 
The foregoing (nearly) exhaustive discussion of the new genera-
tion of dissuasion regulation of the doctor-patient relationship 
demonstrates that (1) the antiabortion groups have taken the oppor-
tunity of Casey to drastically expand the reaches of state legislation 
and (2) the second generation of doctor-patient regulation is differ-
ent in kind than the legislation permitted in Casey and, therefore, re-
quires close scrutiny to ensure fidelity to the constraints imposed on 
state regulation in Casey. 
III.  THE TRUTHFUL AND NONMISLEADING STANDARD IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 
As Part I demonstrates, the truthful and nonmisleading standard 
is an important component of the undue burden framework’s auton-
omy-protecting constraints on the newly approved state regulation of 
abortion.  However, a review of the lower courts’ implementation of 
 
193 Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
194  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (2012); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 63-1-738.3d (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 
171.012(4)–(5), 171.0122 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 253.10 (2014). 
195 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2010). 
196 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
733 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
197 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.039 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65-6709 (2009).  A similar provision in Indiana requires a doctor to disclose that “hu-
man physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.”  IND. CODE 
§ 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (2013). 
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the truthful and nonmisleading standard—particularly the nonmis-
leading component—demonstrates that the lower courts have not 
developed the analytical tools for determining what types of disclo-
sures violate the standard. 
Initially, the lower courts were mostly faced with challenges to 
first-generation informed consent laws, which they approved solely by 
analogy to the Pennsylvania law approved in Casey.  And as challenges 
to second-generation dissuasion laws mount, lower courts appear to 
be deferring to Casey’s goal of enabling state regulation of abortion, 
often to the detriment of close analysis of autonomy-protecting con-
straints of Casey.  In doing so, the courts often either use the doctor’s 
ability to comment on the disclosures to “assuag[e]”198 concerns re-
garding the misleading nature of the required disclosures or require 
doctors to provide additional information not outlined in the statute 
to cure the defect in the statute’s disclosures.  These holdings fun-
damentally misunderstand the imposition of the nonmisleading re-
quirement on the state itself, not the doctor, and lead to odd results 
requiring doctors to give paradoxical and confusing disclosures.  
Moreover, several lower courts’ analyses focus solely on technical 
truthfulness and allow the nonmisleading component of the standard 
to drop out altogether.  Some recent challenges to the more aggres-
sive dissuasion laws appear to have caught the courts’ attentions, but 
the case law is still bereft of clear analysis of what misleading means in 
the Casey context.  Without further elaboration, the standard could 
dissolve into solely a smell test for technical accuracy that cannot per-
form the autonomy-protecting function it was developed to perform. 
The courts have used a doctor’s ability to comment or elaborate 
on the required disclosures in two distinct ways to bypass “truthful 
and nonmisleading” challenges to dissuasion laws.  First, in numerous 
cases, the courts point to the fact that doctors can elaborate on or fur-
ther explain required disclosures to “assuag[e]”199 any constitutional 
concerns that the required disclosure is misleading.  Courts have par-
ticularly relied on this reasoning to approve father liability and medi-
cal assistance provisions.  In Karlin v. Foust, the district court wrote, 
When women are told that fathers are liable for assistance, some women 
may be misled into believing that they will be able to obtain child sup-
port.  But there is nothing in the statute that prevents a physician from 
 
198 Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 492 (7th Cir. 1999). 
199 Id. 
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informing women that although the law makes the father liable for assis-
tance, obtaining that assistance may be difficult.200 
The Seventh Circuit upheld this reasoning.201  The Eight Circuit fol-
lowed suit in Fargo Women’s Health Organization v. Schafer, bolstering its 
decision that the medical assistance and father liability provisions 
were not misleading by construing the statute to allow the physician 
or agent to comment on the information.202  Likewise, in A Woman’s 
Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, the district court relied on 
the doctor’s ability to comment to dismiss claims that the law’s re-
quired disclosures—“‘medical assistance benefits may be available’ 
and . . . the father of the unborn fetus is ‘legally required to assist in the 
support of the child’”203—was misleading:  “No one claims that this in-
formation provides a complete picture of relevant facts on either of 
these issues.  However, the law does not forbid anyone from provid-
ing additional information about either the eligibility criteria for 
medical assistance or the practical realities of collecting child support 
from fathers.”204 
The reasoning in these cases makes a critical error in interpreting 
Casey and thus erodes the protection of the truthful and nonmislead-
ing standard.  Casey imposes limits directly on the state.  The state 
must not require disclosures that, standing alone, are misleading; it is 
not relevant to the constitutional standard if individual doctors may 
remedy the state’s misleading guidance with their own explanations.  
In these cases, the elaboration is not required of doctors, thus the as-
surance of constitutional state-required informed consent dialogue (a 
dialogue that will not mislead a woman’s decision making) will be left 
to the discretion of the woman’s doctor; this is not the result Casey 
demands.  In Karlin, the court recognized that the state-required dis-
closure might mislead women, but found it sufficient that the statute 
did not prevent physicians from remedying this with their own state-
ments.205  This reasoning inverts the Casey standard, requiring only 
that the statute not prohibit a doctor from curing the state’s mislead-
ing disclosure rather than affirmatively requiring the disclosure not 
to be misleading itself. 
 
200 Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1218 (W.D. Wis. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
201 Karlin, 188 F.3d at 492. 
202 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994). 
203 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1451 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citation omitted). 
204 Id. 
205  Karlin, 975 F. Supp. at 1218. 
May 2014] TRUTHFUL BUT MISLEADING? 1395 
 
In other cases, the courts have required doctors to elaborate on the 
state-mandated disclosures in order to remedy their misleading char-
acter.  In Karlin v. Foust, the challenged statute also required a physi-
cian to inform any woman seeking an abortion that “auscultation of 
fetal heart tone services are available that enable a pregnant woman to 
hear her unborn child’s heartbeat.”206  Plaintiffs challenged the provi-
sion as misleading because the majority of women seek abortions be-
fore ten to twelve weeks of pregnancy, the point at which a fetal 
heartbeat can be detected.  While the district court agreed that the 
provision was misleading, the Seventh Circuit reversed.  The court 
required individual physicians, without the direction of the text of 
the statute, to fill in the gaps in the misleading statutory text:  “[T]he 
language of the provision is not so narrow as to preclude a physician 
from being able to fully explain the availability of the identified ser-
vices.  Indeed, we see no reason why the provision would not also ne-
cessitate a physician to fully explain these services at issue.”207  Like-
wise, the court construed the statute, which provided an extensive list 
of risks—including “risks” rejected by the mainstream medical com-
munity such as psychological trauma, danger to subsequent pregnan-
cies, and infertility—to be disclosed to patients, to require doctors to 
use their best medical judgment in characterizing those risks.  In-
deed, the doctor would, if it was in his best medical judgment, be re-
quired to discuss the “risk” of psychological trauma even if only to 
discount it:  “This means that if a physician believes that no psycho-
logical trauma is associated with the abortion procedure to be used, 
that is what the statute requires him or her to tell the patient.”208 
The district court in Alabama took the same approach to another 
second-generation regulation.  In 2002, Alabama passed a law that, 
among other requirements, requires a physician to tell a woman seek-
ing an abortion after nineteen weeks gestational age that 
a. The unborn child may be able to survive outside the womb[,] b. The 
woman has the right to request the physician to use the method of abor-
tion that is most likely to preserve the life of the unborn child, provided 
such abortion is not otherwise prohibited by law[,]  c. If the unborn child 
is born alive, the attending physician has the legal obligation to take all 
reasonable steps necessary to maintain the life and health of the child.209 
 
206 Karlin, 188 F.3d at 491 (emphasis added). 
207 Id. at 492. 
208 Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
209 Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
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Plaintiffs argued that such a statement is likely medically incorrect 
and at minimum misleading.  Therefore, “in order to construe the 
Act as in compliance with Casey’s truthful or not misleading stand-
ard,” the court held: 
[P]hysicians and qualified persons must go beyond a simple mechanical 
reading of the provision and provide the woman with the following in-
formation:  1) a full and complete definition of the term ‘survive’ in ac-
cordance with the physician’s good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature 
of any survival; 3) survival is merely a possibility; 4) survival will or may be 
of extremely limited duration.210 
These holdings escape some of the criticisms above with respect to 
cases where the courts only mention the ability of doctors to com-
ment.  However, by requiring doctors to use their medical judgments 
to cure facially false disclosures requirement, the courts create 
strange results that may solve the “truthfulness” problem but ignore 
the heart of the nonmisleading standard.  For example, after the de-
cision in Karlin, many doctors are required to make disclosures like “I 
am required to tell you that auscultation services are available to ena-
ble you to hear the heartbeat of your unborn child.  However, since 
you are only x weeks pregnant, you will not be able to hear a heart-
beat.”  And “I should warn you of the risk of psychological trauma; I 
believe there is none.”  The court did not consider how the patient is 
likely to interpret these statements or react to the specter of psycho-
logical trauma or detectable fetal heartbeats.  It is unclear what pur-
pose these disclosures can further except to confuse the patient. 
The court’s interpretation of the survival clause in the Alabama 
statute stretches the bounds of constitutional avoidance.  The avoid-
ance doctrine is meant only as a tool for choosing among reasonably 
available interpretations of the statute.  The requirements the court 
imposed on doctors are nowhere to be found within the four corners 
of the text.  But more importantly, the court’s interpretation does not 
solve the misleading problem.  For the many physicians (perhaps all 
who perform abortions) who believe that the survival statement is 
medically false, the result of the court’s holding will be similar to that 
in Karlin.  The physician would be forced to say something that re-
duces to, “Your unborn child may be able to survive outside the 
womb.  However I do not think that your unborn child would be able 
to survive outside the womb in any meaningful sense.”  While the 
court may once again have solved the easier problem of ensuring that 
 
210 Id. at 1203. 
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a disclosure is not false, the court did not truly engage in considering 
what may be misleading to patients.211 
Other doctor-patient regulation challenges demonstrate the lower 
courts’ limited engagement thus far with the meaning of the nonmis-
leading standard and nearly complete deference to the state interest 
in regulation recognized in Casey.  In Eubanks v. Schmidt, a district 
court declared ipso facto that color-enhanced and enlarged photos 
were not misleading without any discussion of its reasoning.212  The 
court also upheld state-created and mandatorily distributed materials 
despite evidence at trial that proved that an agency listed in the state 
materials provided misleading information to patients.213  The court 
held that the misleading character of the agency’s actions did not af-
fect the character of the materials themselves:  “Casey does not re-
quire, however, that every statement made by every agency identified 
be truthful and nonmisleading, merely that the pamphlets themselves 
meet those requirements.”214  The result may be that the state can use 
its materials to guide women to crisis pregnancy centers and other 
organizations that have a documented practice of providing mislead-
ing information.  Such a ruling opens up the possibility for the state 
to do by proxy what it cannot do directly; the court did not analyze 
how this squares with the purposes behind the nonmisleading stand-
ard.  Moreover, in Fargo Women’s Health, despite Casey’s guidance, the 
court focused on the likely effect on all patients rather than those af-
fected by the provision.215  While analyzing a provision that required 
doctors to tell women about the availability of medical assistance and 
father liability for child support (information that was only included 
in the optional state materials in Casey), the Eighth Circuit reasoned 
“[i]f in certain cases such a statement would be misleading or false, it 
 
211 The court did temporarily enjoin the promulgation of the state materials on the ground 
that some of the information “may” have violated Casey’s truthful and not misleading re-
quirement.  Id. at 1204–05.  However, its holding was at best ambivalent.  The court based 
its decision to preliminarily enjoin the materials on three factors: 1) they may not have 
complied with the statute itself, 2) some experts presented conflicting testimony on the 
factual accuracy of the materials, and 3) the legislature’s directive indicated that the ma-
terials were not essential to the Act’s taking effect.  Id. at 1205.  One interesting note, 
however, on the portion of the opinion is the court’s recognition of how false or mislead-
ing materials may interact with and hinder the right; “[i]ndeed, these concerns are bol-
stered by the magnitude of the decision to have an abortion as well as the potential per-
suasiveness that state approved materials may have in this context.”  Id. 
212 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
213 Id. at 458 
214 Id. at 459. 
215  Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533 (1994). 
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would undoubtedly be because of unique and personal background 
facts that would be at least suspected if not known to the woman.”216 
The Eighth Circuit Rounds decisions217 demonstrate how consider-
ation of what is misleading in informed consent regulations has 
dropped out entirely in many courts’ analyses of abortion restrictions.  
First, in 2008, the Eighth Circuit court held en banc that South Dako-
ta’s informed consent law, which required physicians to inform wom-
en that the abortion will terminate the life of a “whole, separate, 
unique, living human being,” is true, not misleading, and constitu-
tionally permissible.218  While the court recognized that “[t]aken in 
isolation,” such a statement “may be read to make a point in the de-
bate about the ethics of abortion,”219 the court considered the statuto-
ry definition of “human being,” provided in a separate section of the 
statute, sufficient to remedy any constitutional problems.  The statute 
defined “human being” as “an individual living member of the spe-
cies of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the 
entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”220  
Reasoning that, by this definition of human being, the statement that 
an abortion terminates a member of the species Homo sapiens is sci-
entifically true, the court concluded that the disclosure was permissi-
ble.221 
The court’s reading implies that the question of what is “mislead-
ing” entirely rises and falls with the question of what is “truthful.”  
Many of the depositions and affidavits in the case focused on whether 
it was “true” that a fetus is a “member of the species Homo sapiens.”222  
The court relied on this evidence to summarily conclude that the 
statement was true and, thus, also not misleading.  As the dissent ex-
plained, the court did not consider the effect of the modifiers 
“whole,” “separate,” “unique,” or “living,” but rather accepted whole-
sale the defense’s explanation of why the state considered that state-
 
216 Id. at 534. 
217  See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
218 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
735, 738 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
219 Id. at 735. 
220 Id. at 727 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
221 Id. at 736. 
222 See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. David Fu-Chi Mark at 2 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, 
North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-4007), 2005 
WL 3531296 (explaining that South Dakota House Bill 1166’s definition of a “human be-
ing” as an “‘individual living member of the species Homo sapiens,’ including human be-
ings living in utero, makes it clear that the statement under [§ 7(1)(b)] is stated as a sci-
entific fact and nothing more”). 
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ment to be true.223  In one sentence, the court dismissed Planned 
Parenthood’s argument regarding the inherently misleading, if not 
factually untrue, nature of the disclosure:  “Planned Parenthood’s ev-
idence and argument rely on the supposition that, in practice, the pa-
tient will not receive or understand the narrow, species-based defini-
tion of ‘human being’ in § 8(4) of the Act, but we are not persuaded 
that this is so.”224 
The court provided no explanation for why it is persuasive that 
women will understand this as a purely factual scientific disclosure 
despite its natural reading as a moral and philosophical one.  It seems 
fair to assume that the question of whether this statement is mislead-
ing—in the sense that it uses the authority of the state and the physi-
cian to make an unsettled moral assertion as if it were a factual and 
settled one—is at least a colorable one to be substantively addressed.  
The court’s failure to explain how it thinks women will understand 
this statement, and how that bears on whether it is misleading, is par-
ticularly troublesome, because it is difficult to imagine what reasona-
ble other meaning or purpose could be assigned to the disclosure.  As 
Robert Post argues, “[i]t hardly seems plausible that a woman could 
be confused about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a 
zebra, a raccoon, or a bat.”225 
When this case returned to the district court, the court struck 
down the provision requiring doctors to inform women of “all known 
medical risks . . . including an [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and 
suicide” and the requirement that doctors advise a woman that she 
“has an existing relationship” with the fetus that “enjoys protection 
under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South 
Dakota.”226  But even though the lower court found the latter provi-
sion to be untruthful and misleading because it could find no basis in 
South Dakota or United States constitutional law for it,227 the Eighth 
Circuit panel accepted the strained construction that this disclosure 
only requires a woman to be informed that she “is legally and consti-
tutionally protected against being forced to have an abortion.”228  
 
223 Rounds, 530 F.3d at 744–45 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
224 Id. at 735 (majority opinion). 
225 Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician 
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 954 (2007). 
226 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 
972, 977–79, 982–83 (D.S.D. 2009) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
227 Id. at 978–79. 
228 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 
669 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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Once again, the court failed to consider how this provision would be 
interpreted by the patient when analyzing the possibly misleading na-
ture of the required disclosure. 
Finally, although both the district court and the Eighth Circuit 
panel found the suicide ideation and suicide disclosure to be not only 
misleading, but also false,229 the Eighth Circuit took the case en banc 
and reversed this holding.230  In holding the disclosure “truthful,” the 
en banc court did somersaults to construe the term “increased risk” 
not to imply any causal relationship.  For example, the court ex-
plained:  “There is a very real difference between (1) a statement that 
an action places an individual at an increased risk for an adverse out-
come, and (2) a statement that, if the individual experiences the ad-
verse outcome, the action will have been the direct cause.”231  But it is 
questionable whether, to a layperson receiving medical advice on a 
procedure, there is a “very real difference” between those statements.  
And in any event, the question in determining the truthfulness of the 
disclosure is not whether the term “increased risk” implies that “the 
action will have been the direct cause” but rather if the term implies 
any causal relationship at all (because there is no medical evidence 
that adequately demonstrates any causal relationship between abor-
tion and suicide or suicide ideation).  The en banc court concluded 
that it does not.232  Therefore, it concluded that correlative evidence 
was sufficient to support the required disclosure. 
In analyzing the disclosure under the nonmisleading standard, 
the en banc court seemingly acknowledged that, without any proof of 
causation, the disclosure would be misleading or irrelevant.  But 
then, the court turned the nonmisleading standard on its head.  The 
question was no longer whether the disclosure misleadingly suggests 
to the patient an unproven causal link between abortion and suicidal 
ideation or suicide.  The court did not consider whether the patient 
would assume at least some proof of causation in light of the required 
disclosure.  Rather, the court held that the disclosure, which it admit-
ted is only relevant to the extent it suggests causation, is not mislead-
ing unless “Planned Parenthood . . . show[s] that abortion has been 
ruled out, to a degree of scientifically accepted certainty, as a statisti-
cally significant causal factor in post-abortion suicides.”233  In other 
 
229 Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 982–83; Rounds, 653 F.3d at 670–73. 
230 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
231 Id. at 896. 
232 Id. at 889 
233 Id. at 900. 
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words, the state has no affirmative obligation to ensure that its re-
quired disclosures do not misleadingly imply unproven inferences; a 
state-required disclosure is only unconstitutional if a plaintiff can 
demonstrate, with absolute certainty, that the implied inferences of a 
disclosure are false.  With this impossibly high standard in place, the 
court rejected Planned Parenthood’s evidence rebutting any causal 
link. 
The en banc court’s analysis essentially eliminated Casey’s affirma-
tive requirement that informed consent disclosures “must be calcu-
lated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”234  In Part I, 
this Article established that the purpose of the truthful and nonmis-
leading standard is to preserve a woman’s autonomy in her decision-
making process.  But the court’s analysis in Rounds entirely ignored 
the effect of the challenged disclosure on a woman’s autonomy.  The 
court never considered the way in which such a disclosure, unsup-
ported by medical evidence, might manipulate a woman’s autono-
mous decision-making. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the lower courts’ reluctance 
to rigorously apply the truthful and nonmisleading standard in light 
of the autonomy principle in Casey.  Until recently, no opinion had 
ever declared a state’s informed consent law misleading.  However, a 
few recent decisions demonstrate that the lower courts are still willing 
to consider such challenges but lack the analytical tools to analyze 
what is misleading under Casey.  In July 2010 and June 2011, district 
court decisions in Nebraska and South Dakota, respectively, tempo-
rarily enjoined the laws requiring doctors to discuss every recorded 
“risk factor” for abortion, discussed above in Subpart II.B.2.235  Both 
courts held that, because the literal language of the bills would cer-
tainly require doctors to discuss invalid and outdated medical studies 
asserting refuted claims such as the breast cancer link, the laws re-
quired the dissemination of untruthful and misleading information.  
These opinions represent a step towards recognizing the importance 
of this standard to maintaining the balance of Casey.  But perhaps be-
cause the information required in these cases was so blatantly un-
truthful, the cases still do not provide much structure for future anal-
ysis under the nonmisleading standard. 
 
234 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
235 Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1046, 1048–49 (D. 
Neb. 2010); Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 
799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1072 (D.S.D. 2011). 
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Recently, in Stuart v. Loomis,236 a district court recognized and ap-
plied the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey’s informed con-
sent holdings.  The court found North Carolina’s ultrasound law—
which required a doctor to display and explain an ultrasound image 
to a patient even if the woman refused to look or listen—irrelevant to 
any proper informed consent dialogue, and therefore unconstitu-
tional under Casey.  The court explained, 
Instead of a “reasonable framework” within which a woman makes the 
decision about terminating a pregnancy, the speech-and-display provision 
is more like an unyielding straightjacket.  It goes well beyond “encour-
ag[ing the pregnant woman] to know that there are philosophic and so-
cial arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of 
continuing the pregnancy to full term” and “taking steps to ensure that 
[her] choice is thoughtful and informed.”  By requiring providers to de-
liver this information to a woman who takes steps not to hear it or would 
be harmed by hearing it, the state has erected an obstacle and has moved 
from “encouraging” to lecturing, using health care providers as its 
mouthpiece.  As discussed above, there is no health reason for requiring 
the disclosure to women who take steps not to hear it or would be 
harmed by hearing it, making this an “unnecessary health regulation[]” 
which is not allowed under Casey.237 
The court’s reasoning in Loomis takes Casey’s truthful, nonmisleading, 
and relevant requirement seriously and applies the relevance prong 
in a manner that effectuates Casey’s purpose:  preserving a woman’s 
autonomous decision-making.  The following part fleshes out a theo-
ry by which courts can consistently apply the nonmisleading require-
ment to the same end. 
IV.  REVIVING THE NONMISLEADING REQUIREMENT:  A RENEWED 
ANALYSIS OF AKRON, THORNBURGH, AND CASEY 
As discussed above, a number of scholars have commented on the 
various ways in which the principles of Casey have eroded and pro-
posed strategies for rebuilding the decision’s foundation.238  Further, 
a look at the case law suggests a possible resurgence of First Amend-
ment compelled speech claims.  Plaintiffs were successful in the dis-
trict courts in both Texas and North Carolina in challenging the 
forced ultrasounds with physician explanations on compelled speech 
grounds (although the Texas decision was reversed by the Fifth Cir-
 
236 No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014). 
237 Id. at *38 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
238 See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
May 2014] TRUTHFUL BUT MISLEADING? 1403 
 
cuit).239  This Article contributes to this literature by focusing on the 
content and enforcement mechanisms for the truthful and nonmis-
leading standard, as a part of the overarching undue burden frame-
work governing abortion restrictions. 
For the reasons outlined in Parts I and II, this Article suggests that 
a better understanding of the truthful and nonmisleading standard is 
an important contribution to any discussion regarding the revival of 
the autonomy-protecting principle in Casey.  Abortion restrictions act 
on women in a variety of ways, but dissuasion laws are increasingly 
common and the focus of significant constitutional litigation.  The 
truthful and nonmisleading standard was designed to regulate these 
laws in particular.  Although Casey overruled portions of Thornburgh 
and Akron, it was careful to limit its holding: 
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when 
the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmis-
leading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant 
health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestation age’ of 
the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowl-
edgement of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.240 
As discussed above, a close reading of Akron, Thornburgh, and Casey 
together demonstrates that the truthful and nonmisleading standard 
derives from concerns regarding women’s autonomy first outlined in 
Akron.  By reexamining the origins of the standard, it becomes clear 
that much of Akron is still good law and provides a useful starting 
point for determining how courts should approach the nonmislead-
ing standard to faithfully implement the autonomy-protecting con-
straints in Casey.  A more robust understanding of the nonmisleading 
standard will have the benefits of (1) protecting the autonomy cen-
tral to Casey; (2) uncovering impermissible purposes in state regula-
tion; and (3) providing a framework for challenging statutes that are 
based solely on impermissible gender stereotypes. 
A.  Retracing Akron — The Origins of the Nonmisleading Standard 
In 1983, the Court considered a challenge to an Ohio statute that 
regulated abortions in a manner remarkably similar to today’s se-
cond-generation dissuasion laws.241  The law limited the performance 
 
239 Stuart, 2014 WL 186310, at *38, *42; Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 976–78 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated by Texas Med. Providers 
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012). 
240 Planned Parenthood of South Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
241 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
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of abortions to hospitals and imposed specific disclosures and a twen-
ty-four-hour waiting period before a woman could certify her in-
formed consent to an abortion.  The informed consent disclosures 
included,  (1) that according to the physician’s best judgment, the 
woman is pregnant; (2) the number of weeks since the probable con-
ception; (3) “that the unborn child is a human life from the moment 
of conception” and a detailed description of the anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of the unborn child of that pregnancy 
“including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, 
including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the 
presence of internal organs and the presence of external members”; 
(4) if after 22 weeks, that the child may be viable and capable of sur-
viving outside the womb, and that “her attending physician has a le-
gal obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and 
health of her viable unborn child during the abortion”; (5) that abor-
tion is “a major surgical procedure which can result in serious com-
plications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, men-
strual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in 
subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially unaf-
fected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may 
have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances”; (6) the avail-
ability of public and private agencies that can provide birth control 
information; and (7) the availability of public and private agencies to 
assist her during pregnancy and after birth, including adoption op-
tions.242  Further, the physician was required to disclose the particular 
risks attendant to the specific pregnancy and the abortion technique 
to be employed. 
Since the law challenged in Akron is more akin to the second-
generation informed consent laws than the law challenged in Casey, 
the Court’s approach to the law in Akron, to the extent we can deter-
mine it was not overruled in Casey, should be helpful to lower courts 
in determining the constitutionality of today’s similar regulations.  
Since Casey, it appears that both scholars and courts alike have mis-
takenly considered all of Akron to be overruled and irrelevant.  There-
fore, consideration of how its remaining holdings may inform the Ca-
sey decision has been under-theorized. 
As Part I established, parts of Akron focused on the right of the 
doctor not to be placed in an “undesired and uncomfortable strait-
jacket” and suggested that the State could not seek to dissuade wom-
 
242 Id. at 423 n.5. 
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en through informed consent laws from seeking an abortion.243  In 
those two respects—special solicitude for the rights of the doctor and 
the absolute prohibition on expressing a preference for childbirth—
Akron is no longer reliable law. 
However, a close reading of the Court’s evaluation of the in-
formed consent provisions demonstrates that its primary concern was 
the misleading nature of the disclosures.  As to the requirement to 
disclose that “the unborn child is a human life,” the Court indicated 
that such a statement was directly inconsistent with Roe and therefore 
could not be adopted by a state in an informed consent regulation.244  
Further, the Court indicated that a detailed description of the specif-
ic fetus’s development would involve “at best speculation.”245  The 
Court was clearly concerned about the accuracy of the information 
and its likelihood to confuse or misinform a patient during her deci-
sion-making process.  In particular, the Court was concerned with the 
statute’s attempt to create the misleading impression that abortion is 
excessively risky to one’s health.  The Court labeled the statement 
“abortion is a major surgical procedure” as “dubious.”246  Finally, the 
Court described the risk disclosures as a “‘parade of horribles’ intended to 
suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure.”247 
Thus, it was primarily to the misleading nature of the aggressive 
informed consent disclosures that the Court objected.  In fact, in a 
footnote the Court indicated that it saw no problem per se with the 
pregnancy, gestational age, or adoption agency disclosures.248  Those 
provisions were struck down on an entirely different ground.249  These 
are precisely the disclosures that the Akron statute had in common 
with the statute in Casey.  The Court only found impermissible, in and 
 
243 Id. at 443–44 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
67 n.8 (1976)). 
244 Id. at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
247 Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
248 Id. at 445 n.37 (“These four subsections require that the patient be informed by the at-
tending physician of the fact that she is pregnant, § 1870.06(B)(1), the gestational age of 
the fetus, § 1870.06(B)(2), the availability of information on birth control and adoption, 
§ 1870.06(B)(6), and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after childbirth, 
§ 1870.06(B)(7).  This information, to the extent it is accurate, certainly is not objection-
able, and probably is routinely made available to the patient.”). 
249 Id. (“We are not persuaded, however, to sever these provisions from the remainder of § 
1870.06(B).  They require that all of the information be given orally by the attending 
physician when much, if not all of it, could be given by a qualified person assisting the 
physician.”). 
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of themselves, those disclosures that the Court determined were mis-
leading, giving an unfair impression of the procedure.  
Thus, the Casey Court’s limitation of its overruling of Akron and 
Thornburgh only to the extent that they struck down “truthful and 
nonmisleading disclosures” can be read to specifically retain the por-
tions of Akron concerned with misleading and manipulative disclo-
sures by incorporation. 
A comparison of Thornburgh and Akron supports this proposition 
and suggests that Casey was primarily overruling Thornburgh, not Ak-
ron, with respect to the content of disclosures.  Unlike the statute in 
Akron, the statute in Thornburgh bore significant resemblance to the 
statute approved in Casey.  In fact, the statute in Casey was a reincarna-
tion of the Thornburgh statute.  It required the disclosure of seven 
pieces of information: 
(a) the name of the physician . . . , (b) the “fact that there may be detri-
mental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately fore-
seeable,” (c) the “particular medical risks associated with the particular 
abortion procedure to be employed,” (d) the probable gestational 
age, . . . (e) the “medical risks associated with carrying her child to 
term” . . . [,] (f) the “fact that medical assistance benefits may be availa-
ble for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,” and (g) the “fact 
that the father is liable to assist” in the child’s support . . . .250 
The law also mandated the provision of state-mandated materials that 
would describe the development of the fetus and provide information 
about alternatives to abortion.251  Unlike Akron, where the Court fo-
cused on the problematic content of the disclosures, the Court in 
Thornburgh relied only on the two propositions that Casey later over-
ruled.  First, the provisions were unconstitutionally designed to per-
suade a woman not to seek an abortion.252  Second, the regulation 
placed the doctor in an “undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket,” 
thus imposing “state medicine” on the woman and barring the pro-
fessional guidance she would ordinarily expect from her physician.253  
The Court did not consider whether the disclosures were “dubious,” 
misleading, or similarly problematic; with the exception perhaps of 
section (b), the disclosures were far too straightforward to support 
such an assertion. 
Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh affirms this interpretation of 
Akron.  In fact, the truthful and nonmisleading standard in Casey was 
 
250 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760–61 (1986). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 762. 
253 Id. at 762–63. 
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likely lifted from his discussion of Akron in the Thornburgh dissent.  
Justice White wrote, 
I have no quarrel with the general proposition, for which I read Akron to 
stand, that a campaign of state-promulgated disinformation cannot be 
justified in the name of ‘informed consent’ or ‘freedom of choice.’  But 
the Pennsylvania statute before us cannot be accused of sharing the flaws 
of the ordinance at issue in Akron.254 
Two paragraphs later, Justice White outlined precisely the “truthful 
and nonmisleading” standard articulated in the plurality opinion in 
Casey:  “It is in the very nature of informed-consent provisions that 
they may produce some anxiety in the patient and influence her in 
her choice.  This is in fact their reason for existence, and—provided 
that the information required is accurate and nonmisleading—it is an en-
tirely salutary reason.”255  In other words, informed consent provisions 
will, by their nature, always tend to either support or not support the 
decision to have an abortion.  But providing a woman with truthful 
and nonmisleading information that is pertinent and “may affect her 
choice” is constitutionally acceptable. 
Given the close relationship between the law in Thornburgh and 
the nearly identical law the Pennsylvania legislature passed just a few 
years later resulting in the Casey decision, it is likely that the truthful 
and nonmisleading standard articulated in Justice White’s dissent is 
an important antecedent of the Casey standard.256  Therefore, his stark 
comparison of what he describes as the “campaign of state-
promulgated disinformation” in the Akron provisions with the Thorn-
burgh provisions should provide a starting point for any Casey nonmis-
leading analysis. 
What is notable is that the disclosures that Justice White labels 
“state-promulgated disinformation” are nearly identical to many pro-
visions in current dissuasion regulations.  The requirement that a 
doctor inform a woman “that the unborn child is a human life from 
the moment of conception” is a precursor to the “whole, separate, 
unique, living human being” disclosures.257  Since the Court applied 
the nonmisleading standard in Akron to strike down that provision, 
 
254 Id. at 800 (White, J., dissenting). 
255 Id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
256 The standard can also be found in the First Amendment commercial speech context, 
which was addressed in the Third Circuit opinion in Casey, and therefore likely influ-
enced the Court’s decision.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991).  Nonetheless, the nonmisleading strand traced from 
Akron to Thornburgh to Casey more closely aligns with the underlying principles of Casey as 
outlined in Part I. 
257  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5 (1983). 
1408 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
the history of the nonmisleading standard casts doubt on the South 
Dakota provision upheld in Rounds.  Likewise, the survival disclosures 
disapproved of in Akron bear a close resemblance to the disclosure 
upheld in Summit Medical Center.258  Finally, the risk disclosures that 
Justice Lewis Powell described as a disingenuous “parade of horri-
bles” match many current mandatory dissuasion regulations, as dis-
cussed above in Part II. 
The nonmisleading analysis in Akron did not concern itself with 
whether any particular statement could be defended as truthful as a 
technical matter, but instead considered what the overall effect of the 
disclosures would be on the patient and whether it would create a 
misleading impression.  Justice White approved of this analysis in his 
Thornburgh dissent, indicating that informed consent regulations 
should be limited to those that are neither untruthful nor mislead-
ing; that analysis was borrowed by the Casey majority.259  Tracing the 
history of the truthful and nonmisleading standard demonstrates that 
(1) the Court has consistently been concerned with misleading dis-
closures, not only technically untruthful disclosures, in order to safe-
guard the autonomy of a woman’s decision that is at the core of the 
abortion right and (2) much of Akron is still good law and provides a 
useful starting point for any analysis of whether an informed consent 
regulation is misleading, and thus, unconstitutional under Casey. 
B. The Nonmisleading Standard:  Protecting the Autonomy Value in Casey 
in Application 
1.  The Nonmisleading Standard in Multiple Roles:  Serving Multiple 
Constitutional Purposes 
As the foregoing Parts have established, a more robust vision of 
the nonmisleading requirement in light of Casey’s goals should aid 
courts in enforcing the autonomy-protecting principle within Casey.  
The question that can be gleaned from Akron is whether the required 
disclosures, and their presentation to the patients, give an honest and 
fair portrayal of relevant information or if, instead, the disclosures are 
likely to manipulate, mislead, or confuse women in the informed 
consent process and/or create a warped vision of the procedure.  
The latter would dangerously threaten a woman’s autonomous deci-
sion-making in the most direct way by inserting misleading considera-
tions into her thought process.  In this way, informed consent disclo-
 
258 Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
259 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
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sures are more dangerous to the core of Roe than logistical barriers.  
But the nonmisleading standard can act as a dyke against such dan-
gers. 
At the same time, the nonmisleading standard can also serve other 
constitutional functions as well.  The nonmisleading requirement can 
act as a proxy for the purpose prong of Casey, which requires that 
state regulation have the purpose of informing, not hindering, a 
woman’s choice.260  State regulation must not have the purpose of 
creating a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking an abortion.  
However, purpose evaluations are notoriously difficult to make.  For 
example, the discriminatory purpose test for race or sex discrimina-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the statute itself is 
race or sex “neutral,” has raised prohibitive barriers to challenging 
acts with discriminatory effects.261  Unless a statute inscribes its uncon-
stitutional purpose into the text, the Court is hesitant to ascribe un-
constitutional purposes to the state where constitutional purposes 
might explain the statute instead. 
Scholars have noted that it has been particularly difficult to prove 
an unconstitutional purpose in the Casey context.262  In Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, the Supreme Court suggested that it is possible that an im-
permissible purpose can never be found without an impermissible ef-
fect.  However, it did not directly so hold.263  Nonetheless, lower 
courts have often ignored the purpose prong entirely or, when they 
have addressed it, “define[d] the test negatively, describing the type 
of evidence that is insufficient to establish improper purpose but 
never indicating what evidence, short of a defendant’s outright ad-
mission on the record, might suffice.”264  Only a few cases have ever 
found an unconstitutional purpose under Casey.265 
A robust application of the nonmisleading standard can help to 
mollify the effects of a weak purpose prong and identify statutes with 
 
260 Id. at 877. 
261 See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (1997). 
262  See, e.g., Wharton, Frietsche & Kolbert, supra note 7, at 378. 
263 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 
264 Wharton, Frietsche &  Kolbert, supra note 7, at 378. 
265 E.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the state requirement that a director obtain a certificate of need in order to 
build an abortion clinic was unconstitutional); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that a state provision that only allowed abortions after twenty weeks 
with only narrow exceptions was unconstitutional); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977 
(E.D. La. 1998),aff’d, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a state statute that rendered the doctor providing an 
abortion liable in tort for any derivative injury to the mother was unconstitutional). 
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unconstitutional purposes as well as effects.  In further explaining the 
purpose prong, the Court in Casey explained that “[a] statute with 
this purpose [of placing a substantial obstacle] is invalid because the 
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must 
be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”266  
Where the regulations run afoul of a robust nonmisleading inquiry, 
meaning that the information is calculated to manipulate or confuse 
a woman’s decision-making process, then the statute does not meet 
the requirement that it be calculated to inform, not hinder, a wom-
an’s decision. 
Finally, as discussed above, the women-protective antiabortion ar-
gument, which underlies many second-generation dissuasion regula-
tions, is premised on impermissible assumptions about women’s role 
in society and their capacity to make independent decisions.  Based 
on these impermissible assumptions, antiabortion advocates support 
regulations that insist that abortion harms women, both physically 
and psychologically, despite the lack of medical evidence supporting 
these claims.  Further, these impermissible assumptions support an 
argument that any and all restrictions on abortion, regardless of the 
veracity of their claims or the legitimacy of their medical motives, are 
acceptable because they “protect” women from their own choices to 
seek abortions. 
The nonmisleading inquiry will invalidate regulations based on such 
impermissible assumptions about women.  Again, the nonmisleading 
inquiry will only allow disclosures that present a fair and accurate im-
pression of the abortion procedure as well as a woman’s alternative 
options.  Therefore, regulations that (1) require disclosures regard-
ing harms to women from abortion that are not medically supported 
or (2) seek to restrict abortion in any manner possible on the theory 
that “abortion always harms women” will be rejected.  These regula-
tions can be exposed as impermissibly supported by gender stereo-
types since their content is misleading.  The content of such disclo-
sures clearly seeks to hinder, not inform, women’s decisions on the 
basis that (1) women lack the capacity to make these choices and (2) 
the natural role for every woman is mother.  Therefore, in addition to 
promoting the autonomy of women’s decisions and identifying stat-
utes with the unconstitutional purpose of creating a substantial ob-
stacle to abortion access, the nonmisleading inquiry can identify stat-
utes supported by impermissible assumptions about women.  The 
following Subpart applies the nonmisleading standard to three of the 
 
266 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). 
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dissuasion laws discussed above to illustrate how it can aid courts in 
applying the autonomy–protecting principle within the undue bur-
den standard and the limits of the standard as an analytic tool. 
2.  The Nonmisleading Standard As Applied 
a.  The “Whole, Separate, Unique, Living Human Being” Disclosure 
As outlined in subpart II.B.6, several states now require doctors to 
tell women that abortion ends the life of a “whole, separate, unique, 
living human being.”  The Eighth Circuit—relying on the technical 
statutory definition of “human being” and depositions from scientists 
stating that accepting such a definition would be scientifically accu-
rate—upheld the requirement against a Casey challenge.267  This dis-
suasion law most clearly demonstrates how the application of the 
nonmisleading standard, in line with its application in Akron and the 
autonomy principle in Casey, would drastically change the legal analy-
sis.  The Eighth Circuit relied on evidence in the record to conclude 
that at least one reading of the language of the disclosure, although 
divergent from common parlance, was not inaccurate and, on that 
basis, upheld the disclosure.268  Under a proper nonmisleading analy-
sis, the court’s task is not to determine whether there is an available, 
technically accurate interpretation of the disclosure.  Rather, the 
court must place itself in the position of the reasonable woman and 
determine whether her likely understanding of the disclosure is one 
that would accurately inform her decision or mislead or manipulate 
her decision-making process. 
From this perspective, the “whole, separate, unique, living human 
being” disclosure almost certainly fails.  The reasonable woman will 
certainly interpret the disclosure as an assertion of the moral status of 
the fetus as a human being:  that the fetus is a human being not in 
the biological sense of being a member of the species Homo sapiens 
but in a “second and distinct sense” that it is a “member of the com-
munity of human persons whose life possesses dignity and warrants 
respect.”269  As Robert Post argues, “It hardly seems plausible that a 
woman could be confused about whether she is carrying the biologi-
cal fetus of a zebra, a raccoon, or a bat.”270 
 
267  Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
738 (8th Cir. 2008). 
268  Id. at 735–36. 
269 Post, supra note 225, at 954–55. 
270 Id. at 954. 
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Understood as portraying this message, it is clear that the state is 
using its power to regulate the doctor-patient relationship to convey 
as fact an answer to the unsettled moral question that underlies the 
entire abortion conflict.  It is precisely because the Court held in Roe, 
and again in Casey, that the state cannot dictate how a woman answers 
the question of whether the fetus constitutes human life that the 
woman has the right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.  
If the woman truly accepted this statement as fact, in all but perhaps 
the rarest circumstances, her decision would be entirely short-
circuited.  Referring back to Akron confirms that this disclosure would 
fail a more robust nonmisleading test.  In Akron, the law required 
doctors to tell women “the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception.”271  The Court rejected the disclosure as “in-
consistent with the Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may 
not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of 
abortions.”272  The state could not lead a woman to believe that an un-
settled question constitutionally left to the individual woman was in-
deed settled.  Indeed, even the Eighth Circuit recognized that to the 
extent that the statement was read to make a “point in the debate 
about the ethics of abortion,” it would be improper under the truth-
ful and nonmisleading standard.273 Therefore, under a more com-
prehensive understanding of the nonmisleading standard, the 
“whole, separate, unique, living human being disclosure” would fail. 
b.  The 2011 South Dakota Dissuasion Law: Risk Disclosures and 
Crisis Pregnancy Center Counseling 
The 2011 South Dakota dissuasion law included many compo-
nents.  This Subpart applies the nonmisleading standard to its risk 
disclosure and crisis pregnancy center sections to demonstrate the 
more complex ways that the standard can change the manner in 
which courts analyze these laws.  Subpart II.B.2. outlined South Dako-
ta’s new risk disclosure law, which would require doctors to screen for 
every “risk factor,” defined broadly, ever reported to be associated 
with abortion ever published in an English peer-reviewed study any-
where since 1972, and disclose any “complications” associated with 
those risk factors.274  Even under the weaker standard courts are cur-
 
271  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5 (1983). 
272  Id. at 444. 
273  Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
735 (8th Cir. 2008). 
274 H.B. 1217, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011). 
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rently enforcing, the district court held that the statute did not pro-
vide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the risks required to be dis-
closed under the law would not be false or patently misleading.  For 
example, the law could require disclosure of an abortion-breast can-
cer link, which has been firmly rejected by the medical literature.275 
However, as discussed above, one could imagine a version of the 
South Dakota law that ensured that the law only covered medically 
accurate studies, but would still require such an abundance of infor-
mation that it would likely severely disrupt the informed consent pro-
cess and the woman’s ability to make an intelligent assessment of her 
options.276  The nonmisleading analysis provides a vehicle for the 
courts to determine whether the dissuasion law disrupts autonomy in 
this manner, regardless of the technical truthfulness of the disclo-
sures.  Again, the question for the courts is whether the risk disclo-
sures, from the perspective of the patient, will provide an accurate 
portrayal of relevant information or disrupt her ability to make a 
competent decision.  Like the disclosure in Akron, the South Dakota 
law would force women to listen to a “parade of horribles” that would 
incorrectly “suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous proce-
dure.”277  Furthermore, the nonmisleading standard would allow the 
courts to take cognizance of the psychological studies and informed 
consent literature that suggests that the disclosure required by this 
law would create the type of cognitive overload that would disrupt a 
patient’s ability to make an informed choice. 
The 2011 South Dakota law also required women to visit crisis 
pregnancy centers for independent counseling before accessing an 
abortion.  The court struck this provision down on the separate First 
Amendment ground of a woman’s right against compelled speech.278  
The nonmisleading standard provides another way of evaluating this 
provision.  Under current case law, the courts would not necessarily 
analyze the content of the possible misleading effects of the provision 
since the counseling is provided by a third party, not the state, and 
the state does not dictate the disclosures the pregnancy center must 
give.  However, under the nonmisleading standard, the question is 
not just whether the state dictates factually inaccurate disclosures.  
Rather, the inquiry is whether the state forces the woman into a posi-
tion where her decision-making will be disrupted by disclosures that 
 
275 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 
2d 1048, 1071–72 (D.S.D. 2011). 
276 See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
277 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983). 
278 Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1054–55, 1077. 
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create false impressions about her options.  Seen in this light, the 
state should not be permitted under the nonmisleading standard to 
delegate the mandatory disclosure process to a third party unless it 
dictates the content of the disclosures.  This is not to suggest that the 
state must dictate the disclosures given by a woman’s doctor, since 
she freely chooses which doctor to approach.  But when the state re-
quires a woman to enter a counseling session in order to access abor-
tion, it must ensure that the content of that discussion is nonmislead-
ing.  In other words, the nonmisleading standard will not allow the 
state to do by proxy what it cannot do directly. 
c.   The Mandatory Ultrasound with Mandatory Descriptions 
Analysis of the mandatory ultrasound laws, in particular those that 
require not only that all women have an ultrasound, but also that eve-
ry woman’s provider show her the image and describe it to her re-
gardless of her wishes,279 demonstrates the limitation of the nonmis-
leading standard as a tool for analyzing abortion regulation under 
the broader undue burden framework.  The mandatory ultrasound 
does not appear to carry the danger most prominent in Akron and 
that the nonmisleading standard was developed to counter:  the use 
of the informed consent dialogue to create false impressions of abor-
tion and its alternatives and the manipulation of a woman’s ability to 
make a competent and knowing decision.  The ultrasound image 
does not introduce misleading information into the informed con-
sent dialogue in the conventional sense.  One could argue that man-
datory ultrasounds seek to emotionally manipulate the decision-
making process and in that sense violate the nonmisleading standard.  
Ultrasound requirements seek to force women to confront an un-
wanted image, powerfully symbolic of motherhood, in the hopes that 
the emotional impact will compel her to continue her pregnancy.  As 
Carol Sanger writes, it “is meant to bend a woman’s will once she has 
already made up her mind to seek an abortion.”280 
However, because the ultrasound image and the doctor’s script do 
not contain the types of confusing or misleading information para-
digmatic of the standard as elaborated in Akron, the nonmisleading 
standard does not seem like the most appropriate tool for analyzing 
these provisions.  Thus, the mandatory ultrasound law illustrates the 
limitations of the nonmisleading standard.  The standard is only one 
 
279 See supra Subpart II.B.5. 
280 Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:  Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 362 (2008). 
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tool for implementing the broader undue burden framework that Ca-
sey implemented to place autonomy–protecting constraints on the 
State’s right to regulate abortion throughout pregnancy.  Ultrasound 
requirements may be more appropriately analyzed directly under the 
undue burden framework; courts must determine whether the laws 
have the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”281  As 
Sanger argues, the distinctiveness of the ultrasound requirement and 
its use of a woman’s own body to produce a powerfully symbolic im-
age of motherhood for the woman to confront may pose such a sub-
stantial obstacle.282  It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze 
how the undue burden framework applies to mandatory ultrasound 
requirements.  However, the application of the nonmisleading stand-
ard to these regulations demonstrates the limits of the standard in 
protecting women’s autonomy and reminds us that the standard is 
only part and parcel of the larger undue burden framework erected 
in Casey. 
CONCLUSION 
Casey sought to strike a balance through the undue burden 
framework between the state’s interest in regulating to protect poten-
tial life and the woman’s liberty interest in autonomously deciding 
whether to continue her pregnancy.  The truthful and nonmisleading 
standard was one of the autonomy-protecting constraints that Casey 
placed on the states as it opened up the space for the state to regulate 
abortion.  A close reading of Akron, Thornburgh, and Casey together 
demonstrates that the nonmisleading standard, at least in part, has its 
roots in the Akron decision.  Doctor-patient dialogue regulation has 
come full circle since the Akron decision.  The Court in Akron struck 
down the challenged statute because it sought to convince women to 
continue their pregnancy through misleading disclosures.  The regu-
lations in Thornburgh and Casey sought to persuade women but 
through nonmisleading means.  However, the new generation of doc-
tor-patient regulations, which this Article has termed dissuasion laws, 
more closely resembles the misleading disclosures of the statute in 
Akron than the disclosures approved in Casey.  Recent case law 
demonstrates that lower courts are seeking to respond to this increas-
ingly aggressive generation of regulations to enforce the balance of 
 
281 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
282 Sanger, supra note 280, at 361. 
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interests recognized in Casey but lack the analytical tools for deter-
mining what is misleading under Casey.  A close reading of Akron can 
provide the starting point for a more robust nonmisleading standard 
that will faithfully implement the principles of Casey. 
 
